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Abstract
We study the persuasive impacts of non-informative communication on the short-run
beliefs and long-run behavior of individuals. We do so in the context of the Papal visit to
Brazil in October 1991, in which persuasive messages related to fertility were salient in Papal
speeches during the visit. We use individual’s exposure to such messages to measure how
persuasion shifts: (i) short-run beliefs such as intentions to contracept; (ii) long-term fertility
outcomes, such as the timing and total number of births. To measure the short run causal
impact of persuasion, we exploit the fact the Brazil 1991 DHS was …elded in the weeks before,
during and after the Papal visit. We use this fortuitous timing to identify that persuasion
signi…cantly reduced individual intentions to contracept by more than 40% relative to pre-
visit levels, and increased the frequency of unprotected sex by 26%. We measure the long-run
causal impacts of persuasion on fertility outcomes using later DHS surveys to conduct an
event study analysis on births in a …ve year window either side of the 1991 Papal visit.
Estimating a hazard model of fertility, we …nd a signi…cant change in births nine months
post-visit, corresponding to a 16% increase in the aggregate birth cohort. Our …nal set of
results examine the very long run impact of persuasion and document the impacts to be on
the timing of births rather than on total fertility. JEL Codes: D83, J13, N36.
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1 Introduction
The beliefs individuals hold are central to economic decision making. Economists have emphasized
two channels for belief formation: (i) direct observation: where beliefs change through private and
social learning; (ii) persuasion: where beliefs are altered through communication by motivated
agents. This paper focuses on the second channel and provides evidence on the causal impact of
persuasion on the beliefs and actual behavior of individuals. We do so by studying the persuasive
impacts of national visits by Pope John Paul II, on the fertility-related beliefs and outcomes of
individuals resident in the visited country.1
The Papal visits we study provide individuals with intense exposure to persuasive messages
related to Catholic Church doctrine as embodied in Papal speeches, media coverage of the visit,
and changes in behavior of other local church leaders in response to the visit. Such visits do not
provide any new information to Catholics: the issues salient in Papal speeches are typically in line
with mainstream Catholic doctrine. However, non-informative dimensions of communication can
a¤ect belief formation through salience, attention and framing [Mullanaithan et al. 2008].
We use this setting to address three research questions. First, do individual fertility-related
beliefs, such as the intent to contracept and ideal family size, shift in response to exposure to
persuasive messages during a Papal visit? Second, does this change in beliefs translate into actual
changes in fertility behavior, as measured by a shift in births occurring nine months after the
Papal visit? Third, are there longer term impacts of persuasion on total fertility, or do such visits
only impact the timing of births?
The choice to study these questions in the context of the Papal visit to Brazil in October 1991
is driven by three factors. First, fertility related issues were salient in Papal speeches in this visit,
with recurring themes being: (i) the condemnation of practices such as contraceptive use, abortion
and family planning; (ii) the importance of marriage and generating o¤spring. Second, the Brazil
1991 Demographic Health Survey (DHS) was in the …eld precisely in the weeks before, during and
after the Papal visit in October 1991. The survey, that is …elded to women, records exact dates
of interview, as well as detailed information on fertility-related beliefs. We exploit this fortuitous
timing in a novel research design to identify the causal impacts of persuasion during the visit on
women’s fertility related beliefs. Third, the same Pope had visited Brazil on earlier occasions. We
can thus document how the topics salient during the 1991 visit di¤ered from those salient in other
visits and use this variation across visits to isolate whether the mere presence of the Pope impacts
fertility behaviors, as could be driven by media reporting of wider Catholic doctrine, or whether
1DellaVigna and Gentzkow [2010] de…ne a persuasive communication to be a message provided by an agent (the
sender) with a potential interest in changing the behavior of another agent (the receiver). Two frameworks exist to
understand persuasive impacts. In the …rst, persuasion a¤ects the beliefs individuals hold, where individuals can
be Bayesian [Stigler 1961, Crawford and Sobel 1982, Gentzkow and Kamenica 2011], or non-Bayesian, say because
either they think categorically [Fryer and Jackson 2008, Mullanaithan et al. 2008] or have limited memory/attention
[Mullanaithan 2002, Eliaz and Spiegler 2011]. Alternatively, persuasion can a¤ect behavior independent of beliefs
as it directly enters utility functions [Stigler and Becker 1977, Becker and Murphy 1993].
2
there is a speci…c driving force on beliefs and behaviors of the persuasive messages recurring in
Papal speeches during the 1991 visit.
To assess the impact of persuasion on actual fertility behaviors, we exploit the Brazil DHS
1996 survey, that records pregnancy histories including the month and year of each birth, to
conduct an event study analysis on births in a …ve year window either side of the 1991 Papal visit.
We estimate a hazard model of fertility to establish whether the probability of having a child
nine months after the October 1991 Papal visit is signi…cantly higher than otherwise predicted
conditional on a non-parametric baseline hazard and other covariates. We also establish whether
this shift in births nine months post-visit signi…cantly di¤ers from the hazard of giving birth eight
and ten months post-visit.2
Any fertility response to persuasion using this identi…cation strategy needs to be carefully
interpreted: the nature of contraceptive technology implies not all households should be able
to induce immediate changes in birth timing as a result of being persuaded. Only those not
contracepting, or using unreliable methods at the time of the visit (such as abstinence, withdrawal
or condoms), can plausibly respond. This interlinks with the earlier analysis where we measure
whether persuasion impacts intentions to contracept (and the form of contraceptive used), thus
potentially leading to a heaping of households onto the margin of being able to immediately respond
to persuasion in terms of fertility outcomes. Furthermore, our research design underestimates the
impact of persuasion on fertility outcomes if some households delay their fertility response to
persuasive messages and respond ten or more months post-visit.
Finally, to understand whether Papal persuasion impacts total fertility in the long run (and
not just the timing of births), we use DHS survey data from 1996 and 2006 to examine entire
pregnancy histories of women that gave birth nine months after the 1991 Papal visit relative to
those that gave birth in adjacent months.
Our main results are as follows. On the immediate impacts of persuasion on fertility-related
beliefs we …nd women interviewed post-visit are 128pp more likely to report not using contra-
ceptives and not planning to do so in the future, relative to those interviewed pre-visit. This
corresponds to more than a 40% increase in intentions not to contracept relative to the pre-visit
mean of 297%, with the impacts being driven by practising Catholics. Examining the daily pat-
tern of intentions to contracept, we …nd a jump in the share of women stating an intent not to
contracept that kicks in on the day the Papal visit starts and persists well after the visit ends.
These documented impacts are unlikely to re‡ect mere reporting biases to survey enumerators
because: (i) the impacts persist months after the visit actually ends; (ii) we …nd no post-visit
change in in Catholics’ responses to other religion-related questions, such as frequency of church
attendance.
2Newman and McMulloch [1984] were among the …rst to use hazard models to estimate models of birth timing.
This is now the standard empirical formulation for estimating fertility outcomes as it allows for duration dependence,
and corrects for censoring bias without introducing selection bias.
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As stated above, a second recurring theme of the visit emphasized the importance of producing
o¤spring. We use self-reports on the ‘frequency of sexual intercourse’ in the DHS 1991 to document
a signi…cant increase on this margin among those interviewed post-visit. We then combine this
outcome with intentions not to contracept to create a measure of the frequency of unprotected
sex : this is the core outcome linking changes in fertility beliefs to fertility outcomes. We …nd
the frequency of unprotected sex signi…cantly increases among Catholics interviewed post-visit by
26%, and this e¤ect is concentrated among practising Catholics.
To summarize, the estimated impacts of Papal persuasion operate through two channels: the
disutility of contracepting leading to a lower intention to contracept, and an increased frequency of
sexual intercourse. These impacts reinforce each other leading to a signi…cantly higher frequency
of unprotected sex. It is thus plausible that a positive fertility response could occur as a result
of the persuasive messages during the Papal visit. On fertility responses to persuasion, we …nd
a signi…cant increase in the hazard rate for births nine months post-visit conditional on a non-
parametric baseline hazard, month and year dummies, mother and household characteristics. We
…nd no evidence of a signi…cant increase in the hazard eight and ten months post-visit. The e¤ect
is largely driven by women whose number of children were below their ideal family size at the time
of the visit. Taking our preferred estimate and scaling up using census data, the implied increase
in the aggregate birth cohort for Brazil in 1992 is 51 971. As the total birth cohort size was 3.3
million, this implies fertility responses to persuasion corresponded to a 16% increase in the size
of the aggregate birth cohort.
Investigating further the inter-temporal shift in birth timing induced by persuasion, our es-
timates reveal there is a signi…cant reduction in the hazard 13 and 15 months post-visit. This
pattern suggests that among those on the margin of being able to respond to the visit in terms
of fertility outcomes, there is a shift of around four to six months in birth timing relative to a
counterfactual world in which households are not exposed to persuasion.3
On the long run impacts of persuasion as measured in the 1996 and 2006 DHS surveys, we
…nd no signi…cant di¤erences between the total fertility outcomes of women that gave birth nine
months post-visit relative to mothers that gave birth in adjacent months, albeit in relatively small
samples. This long run null impact is in line with stated beliefs around the time of the Papal visit
in 1991, where we …nd no impact of persuasion on respondents’ stated ideal family size.
Our analysis provides novel contributions to three literatures: on persuasion, on determinants
of fertility, and on the impacts of leaders. On persuasion, DellaVigna and Gentzkow [2010] review
the evidence that has focused on the response to persuasion by consumers, donors, voters and
investors. We contribute to this literature by providing evidence on the impacts of non-informative
and highly salient communication from a credible source, on the short-run beliefs and long-run
3This shift in timing corresponds to unplannedness [Kearney 2009], rather than ‘unwantedness’ [Rosenzweig and
Wolpin 1993, Pop-Eleches 1996].
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behaviors of households.4
Our work contributes to the literature on the impact of media exposure on fertility and women’s
status [Chong and La Ferrara 2009, Jensen and Oster 2009, Chong et al. 2012, Kearney and Levine
2015]. We provide insights on the impacts on beliefs and behavior of messages of persuasion, and
identify those households most susceptible to persuasion. Our analysis of persuasion driving fertil-
ity outcomes neatly complements existing work that focuses on how social learning impacts fertility
within religious groups [Manski and Mayshar 2003, Munshi and Myaux 2006]. By documenting
impacts of persuasion on fertility outcomes, we add to a nascent literature bridging behavioral
and family economics [Card and Dahl 2011, Adams et al. 2014].
Finally, on the economics of leadership, while studies have shown the importance of leaders
for …rm and macroeconomic outcomes [Bertrand and Schoar 2003, Jones and Olken 2005], our
study is among the …rst to measure the impact of leaders on follower households. We are able
to do so tracing through a rich set of beliefs and behaviors that are impacted through a precise
mechanism: the persuasive e¤orts of a leader. A related study is Stroebel and van Benthem [2013],
who focus on measuring the in‡uence of a local bishop in the Catholic Church on household’s
condom use using DHS data from Kenya. We complement this work by using multiple research
designs to estimate and interpret casual impacts of persuasion on a rich set of fertility preferences
and fertility behaviors.5
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the recurrent persuasive messages of the
Papal visit to Brazil in October 1991. Section 3 describes the DHS data and presents evidence
of the impact of persuasion on fertility beliefs. Section 4 presents evidence on the impact of
persuasion on the timing and total number of births. Section 5 concludes by discussing extending
this work to other DHS samples to study the supply of persuasion by comparing messages in
Papal speeches across country visits. The Appendix presents robustness checks and discusses the
impacts of persuasion on additional early life outcomes.
4There is a body of research examining the impacts of cues/emotions on behavior, and a large literature studying
belief formation in the lab [Loewenstein 2000, Andersen et al. 2009]. In our setting, the emotional cues triggering
changes in beliefs and behavior all stem from persuasive messages. In public …nance, the importance of salience has
also been noted for responses to taxes [Chetty et al. 2009, Finkelstein 2009] or the take-up of bene…ts [Bhargava
and Manoli 2014].
5Stroebel and van Benthem [2013] study whether the appointment of a local bishop, Boniface Lele, in Kenya,
who was counter-doctrine in his assertions on use of condoms, impacted households self-reported condom usage.
Using data from the 2003 and 2008-9 Kenya DHS surveys they estimate Lele’s impact on condom usage using
a triple-di¤erence identi…cation strategy: across time from 2003-8/9, across regions (as Lele was appointed to
the coastal Mombasa region), and between Catholics and non-Catholics in Kenya. They …nd that condom usage
increased by 7pp among married couples as a result of Lele’s appointment. Relatedly, there are studies of exemplars
in the public health literature, where the health-related actions of prominent individuals have been argued to cause
others to follow suit. The mechanisms of persuasion we study are quite di¤erent to such work.
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2 Papal Visits to Brazil
2.1 Background
Between 1979 and 2004, Pope John Paul II made 105 o¢cial trips outside Italy. We study the
impact of one of the longest Papal visits, to Brazil in October 1991, during which he toured 10
cities over 10 days. To put the visit into perspective, we note that fertility rates in Brazil had
been declining since at least the 1980s, in common with many countries. The fertility rate was 44
in 1980, was 29 by 1991, and further reduced to 23 by 2000 [Lam and Marteleto 2005]. These
declines have been shown to be driven by: (i) increased rates of female sterilization [Merrick
and Berquó 1983]; (ii) earlier stopping times, not delayed age at …rst birth [Martine 1996]; (iii)
increased promotion of family planning services by the Brazilian government (for example, the
…rst legal abortion service was created in Sao Paolo in 1989).6
The timing of the Papal visit to Brazil in 1991 is unlikely to be independent of these fertility
trends, or liberalizations in family planning policy. However, our research design exploits within
country comparisons of changes in fertility preferences over a time window overlapping the Papal
visit in October 1991, and within country comparisons of cohort sizes born in adjacent months,
around nine months after the Papal visit. To extrapolate our …ndings to understand the impact of
Papal persuasion on fertility outcomes in other countries at other times, then the issue of how and
when countries are selected for Papal visits becomes more important. We return to such issues in
the conclusion where we discuss the supply of persuasive messages across visits.
2.2 Salient Topics in Papal Visits to Brazil
The Vatican Papal Archive provides complete transcripts of Papal speeches on each foreign visit
including the 32 speeches made in Brazil during October 1991. Table A1 uses these archives to
document the Papal itinerary for the 1991 visit: for each speech we detail its location (city) and
state, the audience present, the topics covered, and its length in words.
Although we focus on documenting the fertility impacts of the October 1991 visit because of its
6Abortion in Brazil is covered in the 1940 Penal Code which states abortion is legal only if there is a serious risk
to life for a woman or in cases of rape. However, until the end of the 1980s, there were no regulations regarding
how this law should be implemented in public hospitals and doctors often refused to conduct abortions in practice.
As a consequence, until the end of the 1980s, the number of legal abortions remained close to zero, while illegal
abortions were frequent. Towards the end of the 1980s, following the end of the conservative military regime,
there was the surge of a political movement aimed at increasing access to legal abortion services. In 1988 the
Progressive Party, which embraced these ideas, won the elections in Sao Paolo, and the year after, in 1989, the
…rst public hospital in Sao Paolo started carrying out legal abortions. The 1990s were characterized by a heated
public debate on the abortion rights of women, with many political groups proposing to make the right to abortion
unconditional. At the same time, an increasing number of hospitals …nally started carrying out legal abortions in
cases of life danger for the woman or rape. Despite rising public support for an unconditional right to abortion,
legislation on abortion in Brazil remains restrictive today, and as a consequence, the cases of illegal abortion remain
very frequent. Consequently, reliable information on abortion rates is only available from the mid 1990s onwards,
so this margin of response is not one we can examine in the context of the Brazil 1991 visit.
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coincidental timing with the Brazil DHS 1991 survey, Pope John Paul II had visited Brazil on two
earlier occasions: (i) in July 1980 he travelled to 13 cities over 13 days, making 49 o¢cial speeches;
(ii) in June 1982 he made a one-day stopover in Brazil on the way to Argentina. We can thus
document how the topics salient during the 1991 Papal visit di¤ered from those in the 1980 visit.
We use these other visits to disentangle whether the mere presence of the Pope during a Papal
visit impacts fertility behaviors, as could be driven by media reporting of broad Catholic doctrine,
or whether there is a speci…c interaction between Papal visits and the persuasive messages that
are most salient during a given visit.7
Table 1 provides a content analysis of Papal speeches during the visit in October 1991 (Panel
A). This shows the number of times certain fertility-related keywords are used, and which speeches
the keyword is used in. For example, contraceptives are mentioned four times, marriage is men-
tioned on 15 occasions, and children are referred to 48 times during the 1991 visit. To benchmark
the frequency of these keywords, the lower half of the table shows the same data for keywords
salient to the Catholic Church but unrelated to fertility. This reveals that family-related issues
are central to the 1991 visit: ‘family’ is mentioned as many times as ‘peace’ and ‘charity’ com-
bined. This also reveals that more speci…c fertility-related keywords are used relatively frequently
in the 1991 visit: the total number of times ‘contraceptives’, ‘abortion’ and ‘sterilization’ are men-
tioned is greater than the number of times ‘education’ is mentioned. Moreover, the speeches in
which fertility-related words (excluding family) are mentioned are signi…cantly longer than other
speeches, implying such themes might be more salient in important speeches.
Panel B of Table 1 repeats the analysis for the same Pope’s 13-day visit to Brazil in 1980,
during which 49 speeches were made. We see that although ‘family’ is mentioned even more
frequently than in the 1991 visit, most fertility-related keywords are not mentioned at all during
the 1980 visit despite there being more speeches than in 1991.
There is no precise algorithm to move from these keywords to categorizing the wider themes
in Papal speeches during the 1991 visit, and of course there is an emerging related literature us-
ing other techniques to measure ‘tone’ or ‘slant’ in media or political communications [Gentzkow
and Shapiro 2010]. Combining the simple word count with a reading of the speeches, we draw
two conclusions on the salient topics of the 1991 visit. The …rst recurring fertility-related mes-
sage is the importance of fully embracing Catholic values, including those relating to sexual and
demographic behaviors. The speeches repeatedly condemn practices such as contraceptive use,
abortion, sterilization, family planning, egotistical sex and divorce. The second recurring theme
is to emphasize the importance of marriage and need to generate o¤spring within marriage.8
7October 12th and November 2nd are national holidays in Brazil. To the best of our knowledge, no additional
holidays were announced to coincide with the Papal visit in 1991. The results we later show using placebo tests
based on other visits help rule out this holiday channel.
8To indicate the tone of these messages, we provide three quotes from speeches: Natal, October 13: “today, when
the Christian belief of millions of souls is endangered by new religious groups, by violence of all kinds – including
the one generated by drug tra¢cking, consumerism and anti-natalist campaigns [...]”; Campo Grande, October
7
To be clear, given the high degree of media penetration in Brazil at the time of visit, we expect
most individuals to be exposed to these messages through widespread media reports of the visit
and information passed through religious organizations, and not through their attendance to the
speeches. We later analyze whether church attendance responded to the visit, and so the likelihood
this second channel might be driving some of the impacts on beliefs and behavior.
2.3 Conceptual Framework and Mapping to Data
In the Appendix we present a standard dynamic model of household behavior interlinking con-
traceptive use, sexual intercourse and the optimal timing of births. We modify this framework
to make precise how (unanticipated) exposure to persuasive messages impacts behavior. The
framework shows how the various channels through which persuasion operates can impact optimal
contraceptive use and hence the timing of births, as well as making precise which households are
most likely to be persuaded. The model highlights that messages salient during Papal speeches
impact behaviors through two channels. First, the visit causes a preference-shock to individuals
so that the marginal disutility of contracepting increases. Second, the Papal visit provides mixed
messages with regards to the frequency with which couples should engage in sexual intercourse.
On the one hand, egotistical sex is condemned; on the other hand, married Catholics are encour-
aged to produce numerous o¤spring. As is intuitive, the impacts through this second channel of
persuasion can reinforce or o¤set those occurring through the …rst channel related to increased
disutility of contracepting: what matters is thus the overall amount of unprotected sex engaged
in, as this can then feed through to longer run impacts on the timing of births and total fertility
over the life cycle.
Our empirical analysis uses Brazil DHS data from 1986, 1991, 1996 and 2006. Each surveys a
cross-section of women aged 15-49 and records retrospective fertility histories including the month
and year of birth of each child. The surveys also contain basic socio-demographic information on
respondents such as their religion, race and education, and proxies for household wealth. The …rst
part of our empirical analysis studies the impact of persuasion on fertility preferences using the 1991
survey. The 1991 visit took place from October 12th to the 21st. The DHS was in the …eld in the
fourth quarter of 1991, with 95% of interviews being conducted between September and December
1991. Exploiting information on exact date of interview, we estimate how fertility preferences
are causally impacted by exposure to persuasive messages, by comparing those interviewed before,
during and after the Papal visit. As detailed below, the DHS data allows us to explore the impacts
of Papal persuasion on self-reported intentions to contracept, and on self-reported frequency of
17: “think about the campaigns favouring divorce, contraceptive use and abortion, which destroy society”[. . . ]
“it is sad to observe a lack of respect for the divine law, which grows together with the di¤usion of highly illicit
contraceptive practices, [it is sad to observe] the alarming number of sterilized women and men, [...] the increase
[..] in the use of abortion, a criminal o¤ence against the …rst human right, [that is], the right to life”; Salvador,
October 20: “the government does not have the right to promote abortion, mass sterilization and the widespread
publicity of arti…cial methods to limit births.”
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sexual intercourse. We then combine these measures to study the impact of persuasion on the
frequency of unprotected sex, that is the key segue into the second part of our analysis, where we
study the long run fertility impacts of persuasion using the 1996 DHS survey.
Three further data related issues are of note. First, as we exploit multiple DHS surveys, it is
important to be clear that the 1991 DHS sample only covers the Northeast region, while the other
surveys have nationwide coverage (Table A2 provides more detail on this point). Hence when
we exploit the surveys from 1986, 1996 and 2006, we show the robustness of our key …ndings to
restricting these samples to the Northeast region.9
Second, almost 80% of Brazilians report being Catholic in 1991: a further 13% report being
of no religion with the remainder being grouped into seven other religions. These non-Catholic
religions are diverse, and no single one of them comprises more than 42% of the sample. Hence
Brazil is not an ideal setting in which to analyze the di¤erential impact of persuasive messages of
Papal visits across individuals of di¤erent religions. Given the sample sizes involved, the impacts
on other religions and the non-religious are never precisely estimated, and so we do not make
strong claims on di¤erential responses to persuasion across such groups in this setting. However,
at some parts of the analysis it remains useful to show impacts speci…cally on Catholics, and
to di¤erentiate between practising and non-practising Catholics (where the latter are de…ned as
Catholics that report never attending church).
Third, an alternative approach would be to use administrative records on births to measure
the impacts on fertility outcomes with more precision than is possible using these DHS samples
(although the DHS data uniquely allows the study of the impact of persuasion on beliefs). Pub-
licly available Brazilian census data contains no information on month of birth. In contrast, the
Brazilian Vital Statistics database (SINASC) collects information on all live births from birth
certi…cates (plus some information on mothers also), but electronic records are only available
from 1994 onwards. Hence we cannot use this data to conduct an event study around the 1991
visit, although we do use this data to examine natural season-of-birth e¤ects, as detailed in the
Appendix.
3 Persuasion and Fertility Preferences
3.1 Empirical Method
We use the 1991 DHS data to study the persuasive impacts of the Papal visit on fertility-related
preferences in a narrow time window around the visit. To measure changes in preferences that map
closely to the desire the contracept, we use two outcomes. In the …rst, all respondents were asked
whether they are currently using contraceptives. All individuals who report currently not using
9Moreover, while regions can be identi…ed in all survey waves, the 1986 and 2006 samples contain no information
on states, while states are recorded in the 1991 and 1996 samples.
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contraceptives are then asked a follow-up question about their intention to use contraceptives in
the future (while those who report currently using contraceptives are asked a follow-up question
about the contraceptive method currently used). We combine answers to both questions to create
a dummy equal to one if the respondent is currently not using contraceptives and does not intend
to do so in future. These individuals are those on the margin of having a child pre-visit. If they
are impacted by persuasive messages, this opens up the possibility of such messages also impacting
actual fertility outcomes. Hence the impact of the visit on the intent to contracept among those
not contracepting is our key outcome, that links preference and behavioral change in response to
persuasion.
For each outcome  we estimate the following probit model,
Prob[ = 1] = ©(X int) (1)
where  is a dummy for whether the individual is interviewed after the Pope’s arrival to
Brazil, as identi…ed from the exact interview date. X includes individual and household charac-
teristics that might correlate with the intentions to contracept, and int includes interview-related
characteristics.10 Equation (1) is estimated using DHS sampling weights, and standard errors are
clustered by week of interview. This clustering re‡ects that identi…cation in our research design
is based on time variation.
Of the 6223 women in the DHS 1991 sample, those that report being sterilized by survey date
are not asked about their intent to contracept, and so are not used to estimate (1): 1520 sterilized
women are removed from the sample, and a further 111 observations are dropped because of
missing covariate data. Hence our baseline estimates use information from 4592 respondents: 17%
were interviewed before the Papal visit started on October 12th; 10% were interviewed during the
visit, and 73% were interviewed post-visit (after October 21st).11
3.2 Balancing Checks on Covariates
The coe¢cient of interest in (1) is the marginal impact of the  dummy variable. The primary
econometric concern is that there are time trends in fertility beliefs during the window in which
the 1991 DHS is …elded (from September to December 1991). In such a narrow window, such time
trends are unlikely to re‡ect societal wide changes in fertility beliefs. Rather such concerns might
10Individual characteristics include the religion, race, education level, marital status, labor market status and age
of the female respondent. Household characteristics include whether the household is female headed, the number of
children alive on survey date, household size, whether the household resides in a rural area, the state of residence,
and various measures of asset ownership to proxy household wealth. Interview characteristics include days since
…rst interview, whether the interview started in the morning, the number of visits required, the interview length,
and enumerator identi…ers. The inclusion of interviewer identi…ers allows us to address concerns that interviewers
might systematically di¤er in how they interpret or elicit responses.
11Women in the sample are on average aged 27 with 148 children. 79% of them have at most primary education,
36% are married, 46% are employed, 23% head their household and 32% reside in rural areas.
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arise from the sampling strategy used for the survey, in particular if those states surveyed earlier
di¤er systematically in terms of fertility beliefs to those surveyed later. Alternatively, there might
be changes in behavior of enumerators (intentional or not) that result in di¤erences over time in
what enumerators record as having been reported.
To assess this concern, Table 2 shows the balance in respondent characteristics between those
interviewed pre- and post-arrival of the Pope. Panel A shows characteristics related to religion
and fertility, and Panel B focuses on other characteristics of the respondent and household. The
…nal column shows p-values of the test of equality between pre- and post-arrival samples (based
on an OLS regression that clusters standard errors by interview week). The samples are balanced
on 17 out of 21 characteristics considered.
Most importantly, in the two interview periods, respondents are equally likely to report being
Catholic, and being Catholic and attending church. On the other hand, household size is slightly
imbalanced: respondents surveyed pre-visit have signi…cantly larger households than those sur-
veyed after the visit starts, although the absolute magnitude of the imbalance is small (household
sizes are 6% larger among those interviewed pre-visit). Two points are of note. First, the number
of children in the household (or ever born) is balanced across samples; hence the di¤erence in
household sizes is driven entirely by the di¤erential presence of adults. Second, the imbalance is
caused by a few outliers (the median and 75th percentiles of the distribution of household size are
the same in both groups of respondents). This imbalance disappears, for example, if we restrict
the sample to households of size 10 or less (that covers 90% of respondents).
We address remaining concerns that the sample of women interviewed pre- and post-arrival
could di¤er on dimensions that drive fertility preferences using three strategies: (i) controlling
for a linear time trend in (1), de…ned as the number of days since the …rst interview took place
in the DHS 1991 survey, to measure whether there is a break in outcomes coincident with the
Papal visit over and above such a linear trend; (ii) using placebo checks based on DHS surveys in
1986 and 1996 to assess whether there are natural changes in responses to such questions with the
length of time the survey is in the …eld; (iii) using methods proposed by Oster [2016] to produce
bias-adjusted estimates assuming unobservables and observables are related in a precise way, and
to bounds our coe¢cient of interest in the presence of such omitted variables bias.12
3.3 Unconditional Impacts
Table 3 provides descriptive evidence to preview our …ndings on the impacts of Papal persuasion on
fertility preferences and beliefs. The …rst row shows that among those interviewed pre-visit, 23%
of women report using contracepting and this falls signi…cantly among those women interviewed
12The other DHS waves for Brazil do not overlap in terms of interview dates with the 1991 wave. In particular,
the 1986 DHS was …elded from May to September 1986 (with no information on day of interview in the data set);
the 1996 DHS was …elded between 26th February 1996 and 8th July 1996, and the 2006 DHS was …elded between
the 31st October 2006 and the 12th May 2007.
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post-arrival. To focus more closely on the intent to contracept, the next row shows that the
intention not to contracept is signi…cantly higher among those interviewed post-arrival. The
unconditional impact is to raise such intentions by 109pp or 367% of the pre-visit mean. Figure
1 graphs the raw (unweighted) three-day moving average time series variation in this intention.
This shows a discernible and permanent rise in the share of households reporting no intent to
contracept that coincides precisely with the dates of the Papal visit.13 Moreover, the impact on
fertility preferences appears to persist months after the Papal visit itself, casting doubt that the
e¤ect is driven merely by households misreporting to DHS enumerators during the period of the
visit itself or in its immediate aftermath.
The next row in Table 3 shows how the frequency of sexual intercourse shifts with the Papal
visit. Those interviewed post-visit report signi…cantly higher levels of sexual activity relative to
those interviewed pre-visit. Finally, we combine this outcome with the earlier information on not
using and not intending to use contraception: multiplying the two outcomes together e¤ectively
creates a measure for the frequency of unprotected sex, that is key to understanding any fertility
response as the conceptual framework in the Appendix highlights. The …nal row shows this to
signi…cantly increase among those interviewed post-arrival relative to those interviewed pre-visit:
the unconditional impact is to raise such behaviors by 371% of the pre-visit mean. This dramatic
response opens up the possibility of persuasive impacts not only on the beliefs of individuals, but
also on their real behaviors in the longer term.
Finally, in Column 4 we report tests of equality based on the Ibragimov and Mueller [2016]
procedure (IM) for time series data that adjusts p-values for cases with few heterogeneous clusters.
For our two key outcomes – on the intent to contracept and the overall frequency of unprotected
sex – we continue to …nd signi…cant di¤erences in pre- and post-arrival survey responses even using
this conservative IM procedure.14
3.4 Contraceptive Use and Intentions to Contracept
Table 4 presents estimates of (1), reporting only the coe¢cient of interest on . To begin
with, we focus on whether respondents report using any form of contraceptive (ignoring additional
information on the intent to contracept). The result in Column 1 shows that controlling for
13To reduce noise in the series, we omit those three-day periods that have the lowest 1% of respondents in any
given three-day period (corresponding to having 16 or fewer responses in a consecutive three-day period) and stop
the series just prior to Christmas 1991. Dropping this restriction gives another 5 data-points: the resulting time
series is very similar to Figure 1.
14The IM procedure essentially comes down to treating each cluster as an independent observation (and is thus
even more conservative than clustering by interview week). The procedure thus involves the following steps: (i)
partitioning the sample into clusters: the 1991 DHS survey extends for 20 weeks and as the visit starts mid-week, we
obtain 5 clusters pre-arrival and 16 clusters post-arrival.; (ii) compute the average response to the survey question
in consideration in each cluster; (iii) treat the cluster averages as observations, and perform a t-test of equality of
means between the 5 “observations” in the pre-arrival and the 16 “observations” in the post-arrival period, allowing
for unequal variances.
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individual and household characteristics, those interviewed after the Papal visit begins are slightly
less likely to report using any contraceptive method, but this is not a signi…cant di¤erence. The
same remains true when interview controls are added. However, Column 3 shows this masks an
impact that varies between those interviewed during the visit and those interviewed post-visit.
Those interviewed during the visit are 4pp less likely to report using contraceptives, an e¤ect
signi…cant at the 1% level and corresponding to a 17% decrease over the pre-visit mean of 233%
of women reporting using any contraceptive method.15
The remainder of the Table focuses on the key outcome where individuals report not con-
tracepting and not intending to contracept in the future. Column 4 shows that conditional on
individual and household characteristics, those interviewed post-arrival are 102pp more likely to
report not using contraceptives on survey date and planning to do so in future, relative to those
interviewed pre-visit. If we conduct a conditional IM test using this speci…cation, the di¤erence
of interest remains signi…cant [p-value = 003].
The result is robust to: (i) the inclusion of interviewer controls,  (Column 5); (ii) restricting
the sample to states where interviews take place before and after the visit began (Column 6). The
magnitude of the di¤erence of interest varies from 102pp to 128pp across speci…cations, and
throughout, it is signi…cant at the 1% level. In both robustness checks, conducting the conditional
IM procedure still implies the coe¢cient of interest is statistically signi…cant [p-value = 022
and .057 respectively]. Adding a linear time trend in (1), we …nd a slight downward trend in
reported intentions not to contracept. The trend has a point estimate of ¡001 [p-value=000],
that obviously is of opposite sign as the coe¢cient of interest. We note further that including
state-speci…c time trends in the baseline speci…cation in Column 5 leaves the coe¢cient of interest
almost unchanged in magnitude, which remains signi…cant at the 1% level. Finally, Column 7
shows the impacts on the intent to contracept persist over time: the responses of those interviewed
during and after the visit are not signi…cantly di¤erent from each other [p-value =771] and both
are signi…cantly di¤erent from the responses of those interviewed pre-visit.
Taking the results together suggests the salient messages in Papal speeches have very short
term impacts on contraceptive use (Column 3), and more persistent impacts on the intent not to
contracept among those not using contraceptives in the …rst place (Columns 4-7). The magnitude
of the impact on intentions is of economic signi…cance: taking the point estimate of 128pp from
the full speci…cation in Column 5, this corresponds to a 43% increase over the pre-visit mean of
297% of women reporting not using contraceptives and not intending to do so. This e¤ect can
be benchmarked against other estimates of persuasion e¤ects in the literature. DellaVigna and
15We further note the changes in contraceptive technologies employed among those that report using some form
of contraception on survey date in the DHS 1991 survey. Among this sample there is a reduction in the percentage
of contracepting women that report using the contraceptive pill (66% to 60%), and an increase in those reporting
using withdrawal (5% to 11%). There is however no change in the percentage of those using condoms, IUDs, or
contraceptive injections. Hence any fertility response, as documented later, likely comes from those that no longer
contracept, or those that switch to more unreliable forms of contraception.
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Kaplan [2007] propose the following persuasion rate to compare estimates across studies:
 = 100£  ¡ 
 ¡  £
1
1¡   (2)
 () denotes the outcome in the treatment (control) group that are the targets of persuasion,
and  () refers to the share in each group that is actually exposed to persuasion. In our
setting, assuming individuals are not subject to persuasion pre-visit (as con…rmed below), and all
individuals are subject to persuasion post-visit (so  ¡ = 1), taking the estimated impact from
Column 5 of Table 4, we derive a persuasion rate of 182%. Figure A1 plots this against other
estimates in the literature, that has largely focused on the persuasion of consumers, voters and
donors. Relative to these studies, Papal persuasion is a quantitatively important phenomenon.16
Probing further to identify households most susceptible to persuasion we note that among
Catholics, the coe¢cient of interest is 117 and signi…cant at the 1% level (implying a persuasion
rate of 244% among Catholics), and among the non-religious the coe¢cient of interest is 088 and
not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. However the e¤ect in this small sub-sample of non-religious
women is imprecisely estimated. Among Catholics, Columns 8 and 9 show those most impacted
by Papal persuasion are those women attending church; the intent to contracept among Catholics
that never attend church is una¤ected by the visit. These results mirror a speci…c implication
of the Becker and Murphy [1993] preference-based model of persuasion, that those who consume
a given good the most are most impacted by persuasive advertising related to that good. This
result also runs counter to the notion that Bayesian-persuasion best explains outcomes in this
context: those attending Church are likely better informed on Catholic doctrine, and so should be
less impacted by messages re-a¢rming this knowledge.17
3.4.1 Robustness
Appendix Tables A3 and A4 present additional evidence directly addressing the concern that
there might be time trends or omitted variables driving changes in the intent to contracept in
the narrow window around the Papal visit. Column 1 of Table A3 bins interview periods into
quarters, splitting pre- and post-visit periods in two equal parts. The omitted category is the …rst
half of interviews prior to the visit. This speci…cation shows no evidence of any signi…cant pre-visit
trends in intentions to contracept. If a channel through which Papal visits impact preferences is
media reporting of issues generally related to Catholic doctrine (rather than the speci…c contents
16The assumption that individuals are not subject to persuasion pre-visit, so  = 0, is consistent with the
evidence presented later in Table A3 that examines the dynamic pattern in the intent not to contracept, and …nds
a jump in such intentions exactly timed with the start of the visit. Moreover, we assume all women are exposed
to the persuasive messages post-visit: media penetration in Brazil in the early 1990s is very high with the vast
majority of households reporting having access to TV, radio or newspapers.
17We document in Table A5 that the frequency of attendance to the church by Catholics is una¤ected by the
visit, so there is less concern that we are here splitting the sample by an endogenous outcome.
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of actual speeches), and if such media reports start pre-visit, we expect to see shifts in beliefs
pre-visit. This does not match the evidence, implying the persuasion embodied in Papal speeches
is the key trigger leading to changes in fertility beliefs (in line with the raw time series evidence in
Figure 1). Moreover, intentions not to contracept remain 125pp higher even a month or two after
the visit has ended (near identical to our baseline estimate), when presumably the daily ‡ow of
information to persuade individuals has diminished. The likelihood that misreporting intentions
to enumerators drives such persistent e¤ects also becomes increasingly implausible.
Columns 2 to 5 in Table A3 perform placebo checks using the DHS data from 1986 and
1996 respectively. In each survey wave we de…ne a placebo  dummy: this is constructed
to replicate the number of days into the survey being …elded when the Papal visit occurred in
1991 (26 days) but applied to these other two survey waves. The 1986 data only contains the
month of interview, so we construct the placebo to be switched on one month into the surveys
being …elded. When estimating these speci…cations we note that the 1986 and 1996 DHS surveys
cover all regions (not just the Northeast region as in the 1991 DHS data), but that the 1986 only
contains region identi…ers, while the 1996 data contains region and state identi…ers (as shown in
Table A2). Hence when using the 1986 DHS survey, we consider two placebos: (i) using all regions
and controlling for region …xed e¤ects (Column 2); (ii) using just observations from the Northeast
region and calculating robust standard errors (Column 3). When using the 1996 DHS survey for
the placebo check it is not possible to restrict the sample only to the Northeast region because
only three interviews take place in the placebo pre-visit period. Hence, we base the placebo check
on all regions but consider two alternative speci…cations: (i) controlling for region …xed e¤ects
(Column 4); (ii) controlling for state …xed e¤ects (Column 5).
The results show that in all four placebo checks using the 1986 and 1996 DHS samples, there
is no evidence of a natural upward jump in responses that occurs around a month into the survey
period, although one of the coe¢cient point estimates is large but imprecisely estimated.
A …nal strategy to address omitted variable bias is to use methods developed in Oster [2016] for
linear models, that allow the coe¢cient of interest to be bounded under assumptions on the nature
of omitted variables.18 To implement the method, we need to make assumptions regarding: (i) the
coe¢cient of proportionality between selection on observables and selection on unobservables ();
(ii) the hypothetical R-squared from a regression including all controls in‡uencing the outcome,
even those actually unobserved (max). We follow Oster’s [2016] recommendation and set  = 1
and max = 13 where  is the R-squared from (1) when all observables are controlled for.
Table A4 reports bias-adjusted estimates for our coe¢cient of interest on the treatment e¤ect
of persuasion on fertility preferences, using a linear probability model for (1). At the foot of each
speci…cation we report the R-squared and the identi…ed set for the coe¢cient of interest. We see a
18More precisely, following Altonji et al. [2005], it is assumed that unobservables follow a proportional selection
rule, with some factor of proportionality . Intuitively,  · 1 then suggests that unobservables are not more
important than observables in explaining the treatment e¤ect of the Papal visit on fertility preferences.
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very similar pattern of coe¢cient estimates and signi…cances across speci…cations and samples as
in the baseline results presented in Table 4. Moreover, in Table A4 whenever signi…cant treatment
e¤ects of being interviewed post-arrival are found, the identi…ed set never includes zero and the
coe¢cient of interest is tightly bounded throughout.
3.5 Sexual Intercourse and Unprotected Sex
Given the salient messages in Papal speeches during the 1991 visit, the second channel through
which the Papal visit can impact individuals is through respondents’ self-reported frequency of
sexual intercourse. We can map this to data because DHS 1991 respondents were asked, “Normally,
how many times a month do you have sex?”. We use a Tobit model to estimate the impacts of
persuasion on this margin. Column 1 of Table 5 shows that on average, respondents report having
signi…cantly more sexual intercourse post-visit. The magnitude of the impact is 860 relative to a
pre-visit mean of 609, corresponding to a 14% increase. Column 2 shows that among Catholics,
those interviewed post-visit report having sexual intercourse signi…cantly more frequently than
Catholics interviewed pre-visit, with the magnitude of the impact being 16%. Columns 3 and 4
further split this sample between practising and non-practising Catholics, and reveals the latter
group are those that signi…cantly respond on this margin.19
Multiplying together the frequency of sexual intercourse outcome with our earlier outcome on
not intending to contracept e¤ectively measures the frequency of unprotected sex. This is the
key outcome that helps pin down the set of households that drive any actual fertility impact
of persuasion. Column 6 shows the frequency of unprotected sex signi…cantly increases among
Catholics interviewed post-visit, with the magnitude being more than double the impact of sexual
intercourse per se. In proportionate terms, the frequency of unprotected sex increases by 30%
among Catholic women interviewed post-arrival relative to those interviewed pre-arrival. Columns
7 and 8 reveal that within Catholics, the frequency of unprotected sex increases entirely among
practising Catholics. This follows naturally from the earlier results: practising Catholics lower
intentions to contracept and have no change in the frequency of sexual intercourse, thus increasing
the overall amount of unprotected sex. In contrast, non-practising Catholics do not change their
contraceptive behaviors or intentions to contracept, and so despite them increasing the frequency
of sexual intercourse, this does not lead the amount of unprotected sex taking place to alter among
this group.
To summarize, the estimated impacts of Papal persuasion appear to operate for practising
Catholics through the two channels described earlier: an increased marginal disutility of con-
tracepting, and the increased frequency of sexual intercourse. Given the two marginal impacts
19When the sample is restricted to the non-religious, we …nd no signi…cant impact on self-reported sexual inter-
course (the coe¢cient of interest is actually negative, ¡541 with a standard error of 750). The question on sexual
intercourse is not asked to those women that report never having had a sexual intercourse in their life. Hence these
impacts are measured from sexually active women.
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reinforce each other, leading to an increased frequency of unprotected sex, it is plausible that a
positive fertility response could exist as a result of the persuasive messages of the Papal visit.20
3.6 Married and Single Women
We can probe further how di¤erent women are heterogeneously impacted by persuasion. An
important margin we can consider is marital status, comparing the response of married and single
women. The comparison is of note because of two reasons. First, individuals engaging in sex out-
of-wedlock (against Catholic doctrine) might be, a priori, less susceptible to persuasive messages
from Papal speeches. Second, the mixed messages of the Papal visit related to sex might cause
di¤erential responses among single and married women. As discussed in Section 2, single women
might be more impacted by messages condemning sex out-of-wedlock, while married women might
be more susceptible to messages encouraging households to produce numerous o¤spring.
Table 6 presents the …ndings, where we split the impacts of persuasion along all the channels
considered: the intent to contracept, the frequency of sexual intercourse, and the frequency of
unprotected sex. We note …rst that the data clearly suggests out-of-wedlock sex occurs: 73% of
single women report having sexual intercourse in the month prior to the survey (compared to 99%
for married women), and single women report having intercourse almost as frequently as married
women (61 times per month versus 76 times). Among single women interviewed post-arrival,
although they report being less likely to contracept in future, they also reduce their frequency of
sexual intercourse so that overall there is no change in the frequency of unprotected sex. Among
married women, there is no change in the intent to contracept but a signi…cant increase in the
frequency of sexual intercourse so that overall, they do engage in signi…cantly more unprotected
sex. The magnitude of this impact corresponds to an increase of 30% over pre-arrival levels.
These results show that even those single women who do not adhere to Catholic norms are
impacted by persuasion: they shift their use of contraceptives in a way that is consistent with
the speci…c persuasive messages targeted towards those engaging in out-of-wedlock. However,
given the impacts on unprotected sex reported in Columns 5 and 6, any fertility impact is likely
more driven by married women. This pattern of heterogenous responses across married and single
women further suggest individuals are responding to speci…c messages of persuasion, rather than
responding to any general phenomena related to a Papal visit (such as being exposed more to
Catholic doctrine, changes in the availability of leisure time etc.).
20These results help mitigate against the concern that the visit impacts behavior merely by increasing the time
devoted to leisure, and that leads to more sexual activity. There is no reason to expect increased leisure time to
a¤ect fertility beliefs as previously documented, nor to have such persistent impacts on those preferences, nor to
impact the frequency of unprotected sex. In other empirical settings, there is anecdotal evidence of the impact of
short run phenomena that operate through changes in time allocation, such as blackouts, on fertility, although the
formal evidence of such e¤ects remains weak.
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3.7 Alternative Mechanisms
The impacts on fertility-related beliefs we have documented in response to the 1991 visit re‡ect
impacts of the salient content of the Papal speeches, the associated media coverage of traditional
Catholic doctrine, and potential changes in behavior/information of other members of the Church
hierarchy. The next two results probe further which of these underlying mechanisms drive these
observed behavioral changes. We …rst check whether the Papal visit increases religiosity among
women, so that the documented impacts might be driven by increased exposure to Catholic doc-
trine as expressed by local leaders, as in Stroebel and van Benthem [2013]. We do so exploiting
questions in the 1991 DHS about the weekly frequency of attendance to church services, and using
an ordered probit model otherwise analogous to (1). Column 1 in Table A5 shows that among
Catholics, there is no change in church attendance between those interviewed pre- and post-visit.
This is despite there being scope for church attendance to increase over pre-visit levels, and the
result further bolsters the evidence against Catholics merely misreporting to enumerators in the
post-visit period on religion-related questions. Among the small sample of non-Catholics, Column
2 also shows no time pattern in attendance to religious services.
Second, we consider attitudes related to HIV-AIDS: as shown in Table 1, this was not a salient
topic of Papal speeches in 1991, but might have been raised in wider discussion of Catholic doctrine
by the media or other members of the church hierarchy, around the time of the visit. Respondents
to the 1991 DHS were asked whether they agreed with the statement that, ‘condoms reduce the
risk of getting HIV’. Column 3 shows that there is no di¤erence in responses to the question
between Catholics interviewed pre- or post-visit. Similarly, Column 4 shows no impacts for the
non-religious. This again suggests it is precisely those themes that are salient in Papal speeches
that persuade Catholics to change fertility preferences, not other information that might have
been conveyed by the media or local church leaders.
Third, to assess whether longer term fertility responses might be impacted we exploit the fact
that interviewees were also asked about their “ideal number of children”. We then use a negative
binomial model to estimate a speci…cation otherwise analogous to (1). Column 5 of Table A5 shows
no impact among Catholics, and Column 6 shows a small positive impact among the non-religious.
This is unsurprising given that the persuasive messages during the visit did not proscribe any such
ideal number of children. This result has two implications for our later analysis. First, we can
validate these responses by examining actual longer term impacts on lifetime fertility. Second,
taking as given the consistency of stated preferences and fertility outcomes over the life cycle, the
result suggests any fertility response to the salience of Catholic doctrine will likely be concentrated
among those early in their fertility cycle, who have greater scope to modify their later behavior in
order to leave total fertility unchanged in the long run. We also validate this implication in the
next stage of analysis.
Finally, we examine whether women report regretting being sterilized, as reported in the 1991
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DHS survey. Table A7 shows that those interviewed during the Papal visit express signi…cantly
more regret about being sterilized than those interviewed pre-visit. Regret is a short run phe-
nomena though in response to the visit: those interviewed post-visit do not respond signi…cantly
di¤erently to those interviewed pre-visit. Among those interviewed during the visit, the expression
of regret is concentrated among practicing Catholics (Columns 4 and 5).
4 Persuasion and Fertility Outcomes
4.1 Empirical Method
We now study the impacts of the Papal visit on actual fertility outcomes using the 1996 Brazil
DHS (that covers all regions in Brazil), exploiting complete retrospective pregnancy histories of
respondents, where month and year of birth of each child are reported. We thus reshape the
cross-sectional data to form a monthly panel of women spanning the period since they turned
age 15, the assumed age at menarche, and are thus considered at risk of giving birth. We can
then estimate the hazard rate for the likelihood a women gives birth in any given month-year
conditional on her pregnancy history. Each woman is included in the estimation only for time
periods when she is at risk of pregnancy, so we exclude the eight months preceding each birth
(when women are temporarily infecundable), and drop sterilized women from the sample from the
month they report becoming sterilized. Finally, we examine potential births occurring in a window
that covers a balanced number of months pre- and post visit (from January 1987 to December
1995). Our working sample then covers 10 347 women who are observed over an aggregate of
698 296 months in which they could potentially have given birth. We use a discrete form of the
proportional hazard model, the complementary log-log hazard model, to estimate the likelihood
of women  reporting a birth in month-year ,
cloglog[(Z)] = 0(t) + ¯Z (3)
The baseline hazard, 0(t), depends non-parametrically on the number of months since the last
birth. The time varying controls conditioned on include the number of boys alive, the number of
children alive, whether the woman is ever married, her age and age squared. The time invariant
covariates include the woman’s employment status, her education, race, dummies for various asset
holdings, whether the household resides in a rural area, and dummies for region of residence (as
the 1996 DHS data covers all regions in Brazil). We account for serially correlated shocks within a
women by clustering standard errors by woman . We also control for month of birth dummies to
capture the fact that children are not equally likely to be born across the year, and year of birth
dummies to capture common shifters of the baseline hazard by year.
Conditional on all other factors, our coe¢cient of interest is whether births are signi…cantly
19
more likely to occur nine months after the 1991 October Papal visit, in July 1992. To be clear,
the DHS 1996 data records the month and year of birth, not the exact date of birth. Assuming
full term pregnancies, those born in July 1992 are most likely to have been conceived in the period
October 5th through to November 12th 1991. Our research design then measures fertility impacts
among households that likely conceived around a week prior to the visit to one month after the
visit o¢cially ends. This measurement error attenuates our coe¢cient of interest.
It is well recognized for many countries that there are seasonal patterns in births [Lam et al.
1994]. We address this issue for Brazil using two approaches. To …rst identify any natural variation
in birth timing across months of the year, we estimate (3) only controlling for the baseline hazard,
month and year dummies for all years excluding 1992. Figure 2A then plots the month dummies
(translated into month of conception dummies assuming full term pregnancies) along with their
associated 95% con…dence intervals. The omitted month of conception dummy is October, the
month of the Papal visit. We see that there are no changes in the hazard of being conceived
in October relative to adjacent months: if anything there is a downward trend in the hazard of
conceptions in the later months of the year (so that fewer children are born in summer months).
A second approach is based on Vital Statistics Data: the advantage is that far larger samples
are available, and the key disadvantage is that such data are only available for 1994 onwards. The
Vital Statistics dataset is known as the SINASC (Sistema de Informação sobre Nascidos Vivos),
and contains birth certi…cate microdata from the Brazilian Health Ministry. Figure A2 provides
evidence from this data. Panel shows data from the …rst year these records are available: 1994.
This is constructed from over 2 million records. The …gure shows a very similar seasonal pattern
to conceptions in Brazil as that found in Figure 2A, based on the DHS sample that excluded 1992,
with no natural jump in the proportion of children conceived in October 1994 relative to adjacent
months (if anything, the opposite is true). We further bolster the evidence from administrative
records using statistics provided in Pinedo and Bermudez [2016]: they report months of birth for
the 2002-2014 period using data from over 32 million birth records from the SINASC. We use this
to construct Panel B in Figure A2 and again show the seasonal pattern of conception over this
long post period. We again see a pattern of month of conception that is very similar to what is
observed in the 1994 data, and indeed is found in the DHS data used for Figure 2A.
Finally, it is important to link any …ndings on birth outcomes back to the results on intentions
to contracept and reiterate the set of households driving any fertility response. The nature of
contraceptive technology implies not all households should be able to induce immediate changes
in birth timing as a result of persuasive messages: only those not contracepting or using unreliable
methods at the time of the visit (such as abstinence, withdrawal or condom use), can plausibly
respond. The earlier …ndings suggested qualitatively important increases post-visit in the share of
households on this precise margin: (i) a near 40% increase in women not contracepting, and not
intending to do so in future; (ii) a near 30% increase in households reporting using methods such
as condoms, abstinence or withdrawal; (iii) a 30% increase in unprotected sex among Catholics.
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4.2 Fertility Responses
Table 7 presents the core results from estimating (3). Column 1 presents a speci…cation in which
we only control for the underlying hazard, month and year dummies, as well as our variable of
interest: a dummy equal to one if a women gives birth in July 1992 (nine months post-visit), and
zero otherwise. We see there is a signi…cant increase in the hazard rate for births in July 1992
relative to what would have been expected conditional on the underlying hazard rate, month and
year dummies. The sign, signi…cance and magnitude of the coe¢cient of interest remains stable
in Column 2 when we control for the full set of covariates described above.
In Column 3 we examine whether there is a signi…cant rise in births in months adjacent to
when a fertility response to persuasion is most likely: we …nd no signi…cant impact on fertility
outcomes eight or ten months after the visit. The coe¢cient of interest remains signi…cant at
the 5% level, and is also signi…cantly di¤erent to the eight month impact. Column 4 then shows
all these core results to be robust to clustering standard errors by religion-time period (the most
relevant dimension of unobserved shocks given the hypothesis under scrutiny), and Column 5
shows the result to be robust to additionally controlling for a further lead and lag. Across all
speci…cations, the pattern of coe¢cients eight to ten months post-visit in 1992 is contrary to the
natural pattern in birth timings across months identi…ed for years outside of 1992 (Figures 2A
and A2).
To make precise the quantitative interpretation of our baseline result, we focus on our preferred
speci…cation in Column 3 of Table 7. This implies the hazard rate increases by exp(238) = 127
so that a woman is 27% more likely to give birth nine months after the Papal Visit, everything
else equal. To convert this into the implied increase in cohort size, we take a 27% random sample
of women that gave birth in July 1992, corresponding to 2% of all women in 1996 DHS sample.
Brazilian census data suggests that in 1991 there were 29 262 727 women aged 15-49 that were non-
sterilized. Hence the implied number of additional births in July 1992 relative to what otherwise
would be predicted from (3) is 002£ 29 262 727 = 51 971. The total birth cohort in 1991 was
3.3 million, so this implies fertility responses to the persuasive messages households were exposed
to during the visit led to a 16% increase in the aggregate birth cohort.21
To place these quantitative e¤ects of persuasion into a wider context, we can compare them to
estimates of factors impacting birth cohort sizes in other studies. For example, Miller and Urdinola
[2010] measure how exogenous changes in co¤ee prices impact fertility among rural households in
Columbia, because changes in co¤ee prices translate into changes in household income in co¤ee
growing regions. They …nd for a county with median co¤ee cultivation, a 25% price decrease in
the year of birth is accompanied by a 4 to 2% percent increase in cohort size. Jayachandran
[2009] studies the impact of wild…re related air pollution on infant mortality in Indonesia. She
21An alternative way to approach the same calculation is to assume births are constant over months. Hence the
27% increase in one month (July 1992) corresponds to an annual increase of 27100 £ 112 = 23%, or 75 900 children.
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documents that …re-induced air pollution is associated with a 1% reduction in cohort-size, aver-
aged across Indonesia for the …ve-month period of high exposure to these events. Against these
benchmarks, the impacts of Papal persuasion on fertility outcomes are large, especially so given
they are generated by temporary, but highly salient, interventions. We reiterate that our research
design underestimates the impact of persuasion on fertility outcomes if some households delay
their fertility response to persuasive messages and respond ten or more months post-visit.22
As it is not possible to give birth in consecutive months, the coe¢cients on the dummies for
eight, nine and ten months after the visit are identi…ed from di¤erent women. Hence the remaining
Columns of Table 7 shed light on which women are most impacted. Column 6 shows the result to
be maintained in the sample of Catholic women. We next probe di¤erential responses of women at
di¤erent parts of the fertility cycle. To do so we use information on the ideal number of children
expressed in the 1996 DHS. Taking as given the visit had no signi…cant impact on this fertility
preference (as shown in Table A5), we split our sample in Columns 7 and 8 into those that were
below or above their ideal family size at the time of the Papal visit in October 1991. This shows
the entire fertility response to persuasion being driven by women that were below their ideal family
size at the time of the visit. Such dynamics are at the heart of the conceptual framework described
in the Appendix: those earlier in the fertility cycle likely have lower capitalized values of preventing
a birth in a given period  given some parity, and hence are more likely to respond to persuasion
all else equal.23
Further mapping the …ndings to the framework, these documented fertility responses are most
likely to arise from those not contracepting or using unreliable methods at the time of the visit.
Hence in the counterfactual scenario absent the visit, we might expect such households to have
22The lack of a ten month impact is entirely consistent with the time pattern of changes in intentions to contracept
found earlier (that lasted many months after exposure to persuasive messages). The reason is that once a couple
switch to unprotected sex (through a combination of changes in contraception and changes in sexual activity), a
women can only get pregnant once. If couples continue to engage in unprotected sex during pregnancy this will
obviously not have an additional impact on fertility beyond the time at which they …rst switched contraceptive
behaviors. Moreover, the fact that the nine and ten month impacts are not signi…cantly di¤erent from each
other might re‡ect some couples have a delayed fertility response to persuasion even with immediate changes in
contraceptive use, as shown earlier, because it can take time to become pregnant after a switch to having more
unprotected sex.
23It is not straightforward to use the 1996 DHS data to identify the marital status of women around the time of
the visit in 1991: the wording of the relevant question is, “in what month and year did you start living with your
(…rst) husband/partner?”. Hence, date at …rst marriage might also refer to the date at which a …rst cohabiting
relationship started. Furthermore, for those that might have married and separated prior to the visit, the 1996
DHS does not record separation dates. Similarly, we cannot split among Catholics as church attendance is only
measured in 1996 (not around the time of the visit in 1991) and because there is evidence of a signi…cant age
gradient in Church attendance. We have examined additional fertility speci…cations split by mother’s education
and age. These show the impacts to be driven by more educated women. However, this is di¢cult to interpret
because practicing Catholics have signi…cantly higher education levels (this is true both in a simple comparison
of means as well as when looking at the coe¢cient on the education variable in a regression predicting whether
Catholics are practicing or not, where also all other individual, household and interview controls are included).
The age split is not informative as neither split is precisely estimated (and so further suggest it is parity relative
to ideal family size rather than age that is the important source of heterogeneity).
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given birth in slightly later time periods. To investigate further this inter-temporal shift in births
induced by Papal persuasion, we estimate our baseline hazard speci…cation (3), additionally allow-
ing for a complete sequence of dummy variables to measure impacts over and above the baseline
hazard for each month, for between four and nineteen months post-visit. Figure 2B plots these
coe¢cients: with so many coe¢cients estimated the precision of each one is less than that reported
throughout Table 7, as expected. Nevertheless, two features emerge: (i) there remains a positive
and signi…cant impact on the hazard nine months after the visit, and this is the only month
post-visit for which this is the case; (ii) there is a signi…cant reduction in the hazard 13 and 15
months post-visit. This switching of impacts around these months suggests that among those that
can realistically respond to the visit in terms of fertility outcomes, there is a shift, of four to six
months, in birth timing as a result of Papal persuasion.
4.2.1 Robustness
Table A6 presents robustness checks on the core fertility result from Column 3 of Table 7. Column
1 of Table A6 considers a wider window for potential births from February 1979 onwards. Column
2 assumes the age of menarche is 12, and in Column 3 we weight observations by the DHS sample
weights multiplied by the fraction of time periods the woman is in the sample. The baseline results
are robust to all three modi…cations. In Column 4 we address concerns over recall error: we do
not …nd any evidence of DHS respondents heaping births in the month of the Papal visit. We
next check whether the visit caused sterilizations to fall. This would be most likely to occur in
the month of the visit: we …nd no such impact (Column 5). Column 6 checks that sterilization
rates are not moving eight to ten months post-visit, that might be indicative of other shocks to
family planning services that might be driving the birth timing results: we …nd no such pattern
of changes.
Columns 7 and 8 of Table A6 present the placebo checks based on the other Papal visits
to Brazil: the major visit of July 1980 (that as documented in Table 1 placed less emphasis
on fertility-related issues), and the one day stopover in June 1982. Estimating placebo fertility
impacts of these visits among our same sample of women, we …nd no signi…cant responses to either
event. As with the earlier results on fertility preferences, these placebo results suggest responses
are not driven by the mere presence of the Pope per se, but are related to the speci…c issues salient
during the 1991 visit.
The …nal set of robustness checks re-estimate (3) using just observations from the Northeast
region in the 1996 DHS and then allowing the hazard to shift by state (Column 9), or using all
regions but allowing the hazard to shift by state (Column 10): the core fertility results are robust
to both modi…cations.
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4.3 Total Fertility
To investigate whether total fertility in the long-run is impacted by persuasion, we use the 1996
and 2006 DHS to compare completed fertility in those survey years, between women that gave birth
eight and nine months after the Papal visit. In the latter group, the earlier results on fertility
outcomes suggest a quarter of women were susceptible to persuasion. Panel A (B) of Table 8
reports fertility outcomes by 1996 (2006). Each row corresponds to a di¤erent outcome: we show
its mean value in the two groups of women (Columns 1 and 2), and the di¤erence in outcomes
(Column 3). As the tests in Table 8 involve small sample sizes, we provide the di¤erences in
outcomes than can be ruled outside a 95% con…dence interval. Column 4 shows the p-value on
the null that the outcomes are the same against a two-sided alternative, and Column 5 shows the
p-value from the same hypothesis test conditional on observables.
Comparing these two groups of women reveals few di¤erences in total fertility by 1996 or
2006: the number of children ever born, the number alive on survey date, the number born since
the visit and the month of birth of the youngest child are not signi…cantly di¤erent between the
groups. This remains the case conditional on observables. Column 3 reveals that we can reject
that the total fertility e¤ects are larger than 669 by 2006 for example (corresponding to around
a 15% increase in children ever born). The next two outcomes in each Panel examine the gender
composition of children ever born as a more subtle route through which longer term impacts might
exist. We again …nd no evidence of long run e¤ects of persuasion. The …nal row checks whether
there are di¤erential impacts on the likelihood of being sterilized by the 1996 or 2006 surveys:
again no signi…cant di¤erences emerge.
In summary, the evidence suggests the …rst order impact of persuasion is in the timing of births
rather than the long run number of births. This is consistent with the earlier documented impacts
on fertility preferences, where we found no impact of persuasion on respondent’s ideal family size
(Table A5). Such null impacts are as expected given that any notion of an ideal number of children
was not communicated in Papal speeches during the 1991 visit.
In the Appendix we provide suggestive results on the early life outcomes of the birth cohort
impacted by persuasion. We use the 1996 and 2006 DHS surveys to trace birthweight outcomes, a
marker for later childhood development. It is natural to examine whether the earlier documented
impact of persuasion on birth timing then impacts the birthweights of a¤ected cohorts, especially
in a developing country context such as Brazil in the early 1990s. Moreover, the null impacts found
on total fertility suggest we identify the impacts of such marginal changes in birth timing on early
life outcomes, holding constant total family size. The Appendix documents tentative evidence
linking persuasion and early life outcomes. In short, those results suggest a negative impact of
persuasion on the birthweight of the most a¤ected cohort, and that this is driven predominantly by
cross sectional di¤erences across mothers between those more and less susceptible to persuasion,
rather than by within-mother impacts of changes in birth timing due to persuasion.
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5 Conclusions
We study the persuasive impacts of non-informative communication on the preferences and actual
behaviors of households. We do so in the context of the Papal visit to Brazil in October 1991,
in which there were recurring fertility-related messages of persuasion in Papal speeches. We thus
extend the realm of empirical studies of persuasion in the …eld, both in terms of who is being
persuaded (households when making decisions over fertility) and the ultimate source of persuasion
[DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010]. The analysis extends the frontier of empirical evidence on
persuasion because: (i) the dimension of persuasion studied, on fertility, has a rich set of associated
short-run beliefs (intent to contracept, ideal family sizes) and longer-run behaviors (births and total
fertility) that we provide novel evidence on; (ii) variation in content across Papal speeches allows
us to pin down the impacts of salient messages of persuasion versus other factors common to
Papal visits, such as media reports, that have been the focus on previous studies of persuasion;
(iii) fertility is an intrinsically important dimension on which to measure persuasive impacts due
to the consequences of the timing and number of births on female labor supply and welfare.
We highlight two directions for future research. First, our research design, exploiting signi…cant
events that occur while major surveys are …elded, can be extended to study other fortuitously-
timed interventions. While we have focused on the particular meta-in‡uence of Papal visits,
persuasive messages provided by politicians or cultural icons might also in‡uence behavior, that
can be relevant for both macro and micro outcomes. The empirical challenge for future work re-
mains to: (i) identify and link a core set of beliefs and behaviors that should be open to persuasion;
(ii) exploit data sources that allow for short and long run impacts of persuasion to be measured.
Second, in this paper we have focused entirely on the response of households in Brazil to
persuasion. However, there are a wider range of DHS samples …elded globally around the time of
Papal visits that allow extension of our analysis on the impacts of Papal persuasion on fertility
outcomes: Table A8 shows other DHS country samples …elded in a …ve year window subsequent to
a Papal visit. This opens up the possibility to empirically study a rich set of research questions on
the supply of persuasive messages around the world. In ongoing work, we are exploring how the
number and content of Papal speeches vary depending on the characteristics of countries visited.
This sheds light on the link between long run trends in fertility in a country and the provision of
persuasive fertility-related messages, and how the supply (and response to) persuasion vary with
levels of economic development, access to and competition in media markets, as well as competition
in the market for religion. This future agenda also potentially allows the separate identi…cation of
such channels related to the characteristics of message receivers, from those related to the tenure
and reputation building desire of the message sender. This takes us one step closer to being able
to simultaneously study the supply of, and response to, persuasion, and so to provide new insights
on the equilibrium e¤ects of persuasion.
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A Appendix
A.1 A Dynamic Model of Fertility
A.1.1 Set-Up
We present a model of a households’ decision making over the timing of births, closely following
the exposition of Arroyo and Zhang [1997]. This can be used to understand the channels through
which persuasive messages impact fertility behaviors, and the types of household most a¤ected.
Households maximize their expected discounted value of utility over the life cycle  =    ,24
max E
P
=
(   ) (4)
where uncertainty could arise from shocks to wages or non-earned income (as has been the focus
of the earlier literature), or preference shocks, that are more relevant in this study.   1 is
a discount factor, () is the period utility function at time ,  are current surviving births
(assumed to be zero or one),  is current family size (so +1 =  + ),  is the quantity
of market goods consumed, and  is the amount of non-work (leisure) time enjoyed. We assume
 = 0 so current births only enter utility through next period’s family size +1, and that 
is concave in .  measures contraceptive use, where  2 [¡ +] ¡ ¸ 0 + · 1, and there
is a disutility from contracepting such that   0 and   0, that might partly stem from
knowing such behaviors violate Catholic doctrine. This framework allows us to make predictions
about equilibrium contraceptive use, and so links the …rst set of empirical results on changes in
intended contraceptive use expressed by individuals in a narrow time window around the time of
the Papal visit in October 1991, to the second set of results on the fertility impacts of the Papal
visit nine months later.25
Households maximize (4) subject to a sequence of budget constraints for each period ,
 + (
_
 ¡) =  +   +   (5)
where  is non-earned income,  is the total amount of time available for work,  is the market
wage,  is the period cost of family size , 

 is the period cost of contraception  and  is
the numeraire good. Contraceptive use, , and the expected number of surviving births in period
24We follow the tradition in demography in attributing household fertility decisions to women rather than couples.
25As Arroyo and Zhang [1997] discuss, this formulation of preferences encompasses many other dynamic models of
fertility including Heckman and Willis [1976], Wolpin [1984], Hotz and Miller [1984], Rosenzweig and Schultz [1985]
and Leung [1991]. In this framework there are no explicit peer in‡uences on fertility, as our focus is on persuasion
rather than social learning driving changes in beliefs and behavior. Manski and Mayshar [2003] structurally estimate
a dynamic fertility model where one component of female utility is the di¤erence between her fertility level and
that of her religious peers.
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, , are related as follows,
 = (1¡ ) (6)
where  measures behaviors that are complementary to non-contraceptive use in producing chil-
dren.  would correspond to the likelihood of a birth assuming no contraceptive use if  = ¡ = 0,
i.e. an individual’s natural fecundity. We might also think of  as the frequency with which a
couple have sex, or the care taken to correctly use any given form of contraception.26
As Arroyo and Zhang [1997] emphasize, in this framework, contraceptive use over the life cycle
is the critical behavior determining the onset and spacing of births over the life cycle. To focus in
on the dynamics of contraceptive use, we …rst de…ne the value function  as the maximized value
of (4) when    and  are chosen optimally,
 () = E
P
=
(¤  
¤
  
¤
  
¤
 ) (7)
Bellman’s optimality principle allows us to rewrite  () as,
 ( ) = max f( ) +  (+1 + 1)g (8)
= max f( ) +  [ ( + 1 + 1) + (1¡ ) ( + 1)]g 
where we note that, starting from family size , family size increases to +1 in period +1 with
probability , and remains at  with probability 1¡ . Substituting in the budget constraint
(5), treating  as …xed, and taking the partial derivative of the right hand side of (8) with respect
to , we derive the household’s optimal contraception rule,


 ¡  = [ ( + 1)¡  ( + 1 + 1)] (9)
The left hand side corresponds to the marginal cost of contraception (): as one more
unit of contraception is used the household has to give up some consumption of market goods
(¡ ), and there is a disutility cost associated with marginal increases in contraception ().
The term in brackets on the right hand side corresponds to the capitalized value (at  + 1) of
preventing a birth in period  given parity , denoted ¢ (+1  + 1). Hence the right hand
side as a whole captures the expected marginal bene…t of contraception () so that (9) can
be rewritten as,
 = ¢ (+1 + 1) =  (10)
While the  is unambiguously positive, the  can be of either sign depending on the
sign of ¢ (+1 +1). Figure A3A illustrates a solution where the value of preventing a birth in
26Rosenzweig and Schultz [1985] assume individuals have incomplete knowledge of . In any given period, their
beliefs about  then inform the decision to contracept.
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period  given parity , is positive and the  is su¢ciently positive to generate an interior
solution for contraceptive use, ¤ . For this household, the expected number of surviving births in
period  is ¤ = (1¡ ¤ ). The other case is when  is so low (or negative if ¢ ()  0),
so that it is everywhere below . The household is then at a corner solution for contraceptive
use, so ¤ = 
¡, and the expected number of surviving births is ¤ = (1¡ ¡).
The model highlights that optimal contraceptive use varies over the life cycle with changes in:
(i) wages and non-earned income; (ii) the relative price of contraception; (ii) the value of preventing
a birth given family size . The framework also makes precise that ‘unplanned births’ in period
 are unanticipated shocks to the expected number of surviving births, ¤ . Such shocks occur
through two channels: (i) changes in optimal contraceptive use, ¤ ; (ii) changes in the frequency
of sex, . Given the salient themes of the Papal visit to Brazil in 1991 described in Section 2, it
is precisely through these channels that we model persuasive messages as operating.
A.1.2 Channels of Persuasion
The …rst salient theme of the Papal visit is the condemnation of practices such as contraceptive use,
abortion, sterilization and family planning. This can be modelled as a preference shock whereby
Catholic households face an increased disutility of contracepting, ¢  0. The second set of
salient persuasive messages are on sexual behaviors, but these are more mixed: on the one hand,
egotistical sex is condemned; on the other hand, followers are encouraged to produce o¤spring.
This translates as ¢ 6= 0, with its sign depending on whichever message prevails.
Preference Shocks Figure A3B shows the change in optimal contraceptive use occurring through
the …rst channel of persuasion: an unanticipated increase in the disutility of contracepting at the
start of period . In the counterfactual scenario without persuasion, the household would have
been at an interior solution, ¤ . Such households are those for whom the value of preventing a
birth in period  given parity  is su¢ciently high. Persuasion causes the  curve to rise,
but there is no change in the . Figure A3B shows the optimal contraceptive use decreases
from ¤ to 
¤¤
 , and the change in the expected number of surviving (or unplanned) births is,
¢ = ¡¢  0 (11)
For households that have a su¢ciently low value of preventing a birth, and so are at the corner
solution  = ¡, the Papal visit has no impact on fertility outcomes through this channel of
persuasion, as Figure A3C shows. Hence if the only channel through which persuasion impacts
fertility choices is through such preference shocks, then unplanned pregnancies will rise according
to (11) and this impact will be concentrated among households that would a priori have been less
likely to have a child in period  in the counterfactual scenario absent persuasion.
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Sexual Intercourse and Unprotected Sex On the second channel through which persuasion
operates, consider …rst the case where ¢  0. Figure A3D shows the impact on households
that would otherwise be at an interior solution for contraceptive use, if this channel operates in
addition to preference shocks. The  curve rises as before but now the  also rises
because of ¢  0. The two channels have o¤setting impacts on ¢¤ : on the one hand the
household has incentives to contracept less because of the higher disutility of contracepting, but
on the other hand the household has incentives to increase contraceptive use because the bene…ts
of preventing a birth have also risen. Thus the change in contraceptive use, and hence the impact
on the number of unplanned births, is ambiguous:
¢ = ¢(1¡ )¡ ¢ (12)
The number of unplanned births increases if the responsiveness to persuasion of sexual frequency,
¢

, is greater than the responsiveness of contraceptive use, ¢

, so that the amount of unprotected
sex increases. In the empirical analysis this is then a key outcome linking persuasive impacts on
fertility-related beliefs through to actual fertility outcomes.
For households that are initially at the lower corner solution with regards to contraceptive use
absent persuasion (¤ = 
¡), if persuasion also causes ¢  0 then such households can also be
impacted (which is not true for such households if persuasion operates only through shocks to the
disutility of contracepting). Figure A3E shows that if the increase in the  is su¢ciently
large then the household …nds it optimal to increase its contraceptive use from ¡ to ¤¤ and the
overall change in the expected number of unplanned births is,
¢ = ¢(1¡ ¡)¡ ¢ (13)
the sign of which is ambiguous, and again depends on the relative responsiveness to persuasion of
 and optimal contraceptive use, i.e. whether the frequency of unprotected sex rises or falls.
Finally, given the tone of some messages related to sexual behavior in the Papal speeches
in 1991, especially related to sex out-of-wedlock, some individuals – especially singles – could
plausibly respond by reducing  (that would be consistent with the point estimate reported in
Column 3 of Table 6). In this case the  falls. For those households initially using some
contraception above ¡, this e¤ect reinforces the incentives to reduce contraceptive use caused
by persuasive messages increasing the disutility of contracepting. Overall this has ambiguous
impacts on the change in the expected number of unplanned births. This ambiguity arises because
although less contraception is being used, less sexual intercourse (say) is also taking place. Again,
this increases the number of unplanned births if the net frequency of unprotected sex increases,
namely the responsiveness in terms of sexual frequency, ¢

, is greater than the response in terms
of equilibrium contraceptive use, ¢

. This case is shown in Figure A3F when the impacts are
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constructed to be of similar magnitude so that although equilibrium contraceptive use falls, there
is little change in the expected number of unplanned children.
A.2 Early Life Outcomes
To provide some tentative evidence on the impact of persuasion on the early life outcomes of those
born nine months after the Papal visit, we use the 1996 DHS data where we examine mortality and
birthweight outcomes. The motivation for doing so is that we have previously shown persuasion to
impact preferences to contracept and subsequently the timing of fertility outcomes. This change
in birth timing can potentially a¤ect early life impacts both through established links between
birth-spacing, mortality and the biological ability to breast-feed [Millman and Palloni 1986], as
well as economic channels such as a decreased ability of households to smooth consumption (if
capital markets are imperfect) or fully exploit scale economies relative to the optimal path of births
absent persuasion [Newman and McCulloch 1984]. As described in Figure 2B, births appear to be
shifted forward four to six months relative to a counterfactual absent any persuasion. Moreover,
the evidence presented in Table 8 suggests in this context we identify the impacts of such marginal
changes in birth timing on early life outcomes, holding constant total fertility.
It is important to …rst understand any potential selection into mortality before other outcomes
are considered. Hence we …rst use the 1996 DHS data to estimate the likelihood of survival until
survey date, and whether this di¤ers by birth cohort. The DHS 1996 data records mortality
histories of all children born to surveyed mothers. We use a probit model to estimate whether a
child born nine months post-visit has a di¤erential survival rate than adjacent birth cohorts. To
reiterate, as the data only contains month and year of birth (but not exact date of birth), we de…ne
those born in July 1992 to be born nine-months post-visit. Assuming full term pregnancies, such
individuals would have been conceived between October 5th and November 12th 1991. However,
we might expect any mortality impacts to be concentrated among those conceived around the time
of the visit but who are born prematurely, typically de…ned to be pregnancies of length around
37 weeks. Such premature births would, if actually conceived during the period of October 12-21,
occur between June 27th and July 6th. More generally, premature births conceived during or a
few weeks after the Papal visit will largely be recorded as occurring eight months post-visit.
Column 1 of Table A9 reports marginal e¤ects from a probit model where the outcome is a
dummy equal to one if child is alive on DHS 1996 survey data. We condition on child controls
(birth order and gender), the time invariant mother controls used earlier in the fertility analysis, as
well as month and year of birth dummies. As before, we cluster standard errors by religion-region
to account for common shocks to women of the same religious group and geographic location. We
…nd that there is no impact on the likelihood of survival for children born nine months post-visit:
these children if conceived around the time of visit experienced full term pregnancies. On the other
hand, we …nd those born eight months post-visit are signi…cantly less likely to survive to 1996:
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these children if conceived around the time of visit were likely born premature. Future research
based on exact date of birth and large samples of administrative records needs to probe this
further: for our purposes, we note this mortality selection, and unobservable dates of conception,
are important caveats to be borne in mind for the subsequent analysis.
A.2.1 Administrative Birthweight Records
The 1996 DHS asks respondents to report the birthweight of each child born in the …ve years prior
to survey date. Birthweights are recorded from administrative health card data for women with
such information. We use this data to estimate the following OLS speci…cation,
log  = I( = Papal Visit+9) + 0X + 1X (14)
+
X
I(  ) +
X
I(  ) + 
where  is the administratively recorded birthweight (in grams) of child  born to mother  in
month-year , X and X are the same child controls and time invariant mother controls used
above in the mortality speci…cation, and (14) also includes a full set of month and year of birth
dummies. Our coe¢cient of interest is , that measures the percentage impact on birthweight of
having been born nine-months post-visit. We continue to cluster standard errors by religion-region.
Our working sample covers 4117 children born to 3198 mothers.
Column 2 in Table A9 shows that unconditionally, the birthweight of the cohort born nine
months post-visit is on average 57% lower than other cohorts. Column 3 shows once child and
mother characteristics are controlled for, this di¤erence in birthweight is 71% and statistically
signi…cant at the 6% level. This reiterates a theme throughout the earlier documented impacts
of persuasion: there is heterogeneity across individuals in their susceptibility to persuasion, so it
is vital to control for mother characteristics. Column 4 shows birthweight impacts for adjacent
month-year birth cohorts: it is only those born nine months post-visit that have signi…cantly lower
birthweights. The marginal e¤ect of being born nine months post-visit is statistically di¤erent from
the adjacent cohort born ten months post-visit. It is not however di¤erent, at conventional levels,
from those born eight months later, that as the earlier results hinted at, might capture some
fraction of premature births among those conceived around the time of the visit.
We next consider quantile regression estimates to examine how the conditional birthweight dis-
tribution varies by birth cohort. Figure A4A shows that among those born nine months post-visit,
the negative mean impacts in Table A9 are driven by the left tail of the birthweight distribu-
tion. We note that the 50th (20th) percentiles in the distribution correspond to birthweights of
3300g (2800g) and the very lowest percentile corresponds to 1500g, the typical de…nition of a low
birth weight. Hence exposure to persuasive fertility-related messages shifts births from the me-
dian birthweight to around the 33rd percentile. As detailed below, this change in the birthweight
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distribution is predominantly driven by cross sectional di¤erences in mothers that are susceptible
to persuasion to those that are not, and hence not driven by within-mother di¤erences in birth
timing.27
Figure A4B shows a similar distributional pattern for those born eight-months post visit, and
Figure A4C shows less evidence of such distributional impacts are found for the cohort born ten
months post-visit (for whom no mean impact was found either).28
The 7% reduction in mean birthweight found in our baseline estimate in Column 4 picks up
combined e¤ects of cross sectional di¤erences across mothers in their susceptibility to persuasion,
and within-mother impacts of a changed timing of births (holding constant total fertility). To
probe the relative importance of each channel we exploit the subsample of 810 mothers that give
birth multiple times between 1991 and 1996. Column 5 estimates our baseline speci…cation in
this subsample. The earlier results are qualitatively replicated: the cohort of children born nine
months post-visit have, on average, birthweights that are 122% lower than otherwise predicted.
There is no signi…cant impact on birthweight of having been born eight or ten months post-visit,
and both these estimates are signi…cantly di¤erent from the nine month impact. This magnitude
of impact corresponds to an average reduction in birthweight of 395g, or equivalent to shifting
births from the median birthweight (3250g) to the 24th percentile. The quantitative impacts of
persuasion are then similar to the impacts documented in other studies examining cross sectional
di¤erences across mothers driving birthweights, such as smoking [Almond et al. 2005: ¡6%, Lien
and Evans 2005: ¡54%], and black-white di¤erentials in the US: ¡11% [Pitts et al. 2011].
Column 6 then repeats the estimation in this subsample but additionally controlling for mother
…xed e¤ects in (14): this isolates the within-mother impact of di¤erentially timed births in response
to persuasion. We …nd no signi…cant impacts on the birthweight of the cohort born nine months
post-visit.29 In short, these tentative results suggest the documented impacts of persuasion on
early life outcomes are driven predominantly by cross sectional di¤erences across mothers between
those more and less susceptible to persuasion, rather than within-mother impacts of changes in
birth timing due to persuasion.
27If we take the view that the entire e¤ect is driven by around 27% of those actually born nine months post-
visit, then the impact on those children is approximately the equivalent of moving from the median birthweight to
birthweights at around the 8th percentile.
28Robust standard errors are shown. Applying the methods for extremal quantile regression in Chernozhukov
and Fernandez-Val [2011] is likely to lead to wider con…dence intervals at the tails of the conditional distribution.
This further highlights the need to revisit these …ndings with larger administrative data sets.
29We can compare this e¤ect to those of shocks in utero on birthweights: assuming selection into pregnancy is
uncorrelated with shocks, these typically identify within-mother e¤ects. This literature, reviewed in Almond and
Currie [2011], has, for example, documented the impacts of 9/11 via stress on mothers to reduce birthweights by
between zero and 1% among US, Colombian and Dutch neonates. In terms of nutrition during pregnancy, Almond
and Mazumdur [2011] document a ¡12% ITT impact on birthweights of fasting during Ramadan.
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A.2.2 Self-reported Birthweights
To bridge the last set of results on the impacts of persuasion on birthweights, to its impact on
later life outcomes, we document whether mothers’ self-reports of each child’s birthweight also
vary across birth cohorts. If parents are aware of the relative birthweight of children, this has
implications for how to interpret later life outcomes – these would be driven both by direct e¤ects
of birthweight, as well as endogenous changes in parental behavior (compensating or reinforcing)
towards the child, conditional on their birthweight. In the 1996 DHS mothers were asked to self-
report the birthweight of each child born in the …ve years prior to the survey using a …ve-point
scale (1 = very small,...,5 = very large). We use this as our dependent variable in an ordered
probit speci…cation that is otherwise analogous to (14). Column 7 of Table A9 reports the result:
mothers self report children born nine and ten months post-visit to be signi…cantly smaller at
birth than in other cohorts, including those born eight months post-visit. Column 8 extends the
cohorts considered to also run to 11 months post-visit and it remains the case that mothers self-
report those children born nine or ten months post-visit to be signi…cantly smaller than in other
cohorts. This certainly suggests that mothers most susceptible to persuasion might be aware of
any di¤erences in birthweight among children born in the nine-ten month post-visit window, and
thus they have the possibility to respond to this information during the child’s early years. We
leave for future research, with the potential use of larger administrative data sets, the goal of
further tracing this cohort through their life cycle.
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Table 1: Keywords from Papal Visits to Brazil in 1991 and 1980
The number of times each word was pronounced during the visit is shown below
The number in parentheses refers to speech number, as recorded on the Pope's 1991 itinerary
Keyword Total times said Speeches Total times said Speeches
Contraceptives 4 Campo Grande (18, 19),Salvador (27- twice) 0
Abortion 4 Campo Grande (18, 19),Salvador (27 - twice) 0
Sterilization 2 Campo Grande (19),Salvador (27) 0
Anti-natalist campaigns 1 Natal (3) 0
Divorce 1 Campo Grande (18) 0
Marriage 15
Natal (5, 6), Cuiaba (16),
Campo Grande (18 - 10
times, 19 - twice)
4 Rio de Janeiro (3times), Porto Alegre
Children 48
Brasilia (8 - twice),
Goiania (11), Cuiaba (14 -
twice, 15), Vitoria (23, 24,
25 - twice), Salvador (27 -
thirty six times, 28),
Salvador da Bahia (30)
18
Rio de Janeiro (five
times), Sao Paolo,
Aparecida (twice), Porto
Alegre (five times),
Curitiba (twice),
Salvador da Bahia,
Teresina Airport, Belem
Family 82 Numerous 123 Numerous
Peace 44 50
Charity 39 49
Education 9 8
Poverty/Poor 43 130
Faith 130 148
HIV/AIDS 0 0
Average length of speeches (words) that
include keywords related to fertility 1847
Average length of speeches (words) that DO
NOT include keywords related to fertility 1224
Panel A: 1991 Visit Panel B: 1980 Visit
Notes: Transcripts of each speech were obtained from the Papal Archives of the Vatican, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/it.html (accessed April 2015). Panel A for the 1991
Visit to Brazil is based on all 32 speeches pronounced by the Pope (including three speeches that were translated from Portuguese by the authors as no official translation was
provided in the Archives). In the speeches column, we record which speech in the itinerary the keyword was said in, and the total number of times the keyword was said during the
speech. Panel B for the 1980 visit is based on all 49 speeches pronounced by the Pope during the visit (including one speech that was translated from Portuguese by the authors as no
official translation was provided in the Archives). Fertility related keywords include: contraceptives, abortion, sterilization, anti-natalist campaigns, divorce, marriage, children.
Table 2: Balance, by 1991 DHS Interview Timing
Means, standard deviations in parentheses, p-values in brackets
(1) Interviewed
Pre-arrival
(2) Interviewed
Post-arrival
(3) P-value on test
of equality
A. Religion and Fertility Related
Catholic .751 .799
(.433) (.401)
Other Religion .095 .072
(.293) (.258)
Non Religious .154 .130
(.361) (.336)
Catholic and Attending Church .594 .640
(.491) (.480)
Number of Children Ever Born 1.47 1.83
(2.49) (2.91)
Number of Children Alive 1.25 1.54
(1.96) (2.38)
1.04 1.25
(1.69) (1.92)
Household Size 6.31 5.96
(2.91) (2.69)
B. Respondent and Household Related
No Education .117 .166
(.321) (.372)
Primary Education Level .627 .634
(.4834) (.482)
Secondary Education Level .223 .161
(.416) (.368)
Married .321 .366
(.467) (.482)
Employed .506 .453
(.500) (.498)
Female Headed Household .228 .229
(.420) (.420)
Age 25.9 26.7
(9.22) (9.72)
White .241 .219
(.428) (.414)
Parda/Mulata/Morena Race .663 .705
(.473) (.456)
Other Race (Black/Oriental/Indian) .096 .076
(.294) (.266)
Rural Location .228 .341
(.420) (.474)
Owns Refrigerator .702 .509
(.458) (.500)
Owns Car .189 .127
(.392) (.333)
Number of Children Living in the
Same Household as Respondent
[.360]
[.679]
[.144]
[.623]
[.729]
[.212]
[.008]
[.172]
[.815]
[.346]
[.569]
[.884]
[.089]
[.288]
Notes: All statistics are based on the sample of non-sterilized women in the Brazil DHS 1991 data. Column 1 reports
characteristics of women interviewed prior to the start of the Papal visit (so from September 16th 1991 to 11th October
1991), and Column 2 reports characteristics of women interviewed post-arrival (so from October 12th 1991 to 6th
February 1992). Column 3 shows p-values of the test of equality from an OLS regression (that weights using the DHS
sample weights) and allows the error term to be clustered by week of interview.
[.780]
[.696]
[.099]
[.789]
[.176]
[.993]
[.025]
Table 3: Fertility Related Preferences, by 1991 DHS Interview Timing
Mean, standard deviation in parentheses and p-value on tests of equality in square brackets
(1) Interviewed
Pre-Arrival
(2) Interviewed
Post-Arrival
(3) Test of Equality
[Col 1. = Col. 2]
(4) Test of Equality using
Ibragimov and Mueller [2016]
procedure [ Col 1. = Col. 2]
Currently Using Contraceptives .233 .192
(.423) (.394)
.297 .406
(.457) (.491)
6.07 7.12
(5.65) (6.31)
Monthly Frequency of Unprotected Sex 1.67 2.29
(4.39) (4.64)
[.000] [.069]
Notes: All statistics are based on the sample of non-sterilized women in the Brazil DHS 1991 data. We report the mean of each statistic, and its standard deviation in parentheses below. The third
outcome considered is based on respondent's response to the question, "How many times a month do you usually have sexual intercourse?". The final outcome multiplies the second and third
outcomes together, creating a measure for the frequency of unprotected sex. Interview dates range from September 16th 1991 to February 6th 1992. The Pope arrived to Brazil on October 12th 1991
and left on October 21st 1991. In Column 3, the p-value on the test of equality is based on an OLS regression of the outcome of interest regressed against a dummy for whether the respondent is
interviewed pre or post-arrival of the Pope to Brazil. The regression uses DHS sample weights and allows the error term to be clustered by week of interview. Column 4 reports p-values from the testing
procedure for inference with few heterogeneous clusters described in Ibragimov and Mueller [2016].
How Many Times A Month Do You Usually
Have Sexual Intercourse? [.000] [.309]
Does Not Use Contraceptives and Does Not
Plan To Use Them in the Future [yes=1] [.000] [.002]
[.041] [.865]
Table 4: Persuasion, Contraceptive Use and Intentions to Contracept
Marginal probit estimates reported throughout
Standard errors clustered by interview week
Dependent Variable:
(1) Individual and
Household Controls
(2) Interview
Controls (3) Decay
(4) Individual and
Household Controls
(5) Interview
Controls
(6) Limited
States (7) Decay
(8) Catholic,
Attending
Church
(9) Catholic, Not
Attending
Church
Interviewed After Pope's Arrival -.015 -.030 .102*** .128*** .115*** .129*** .079
(.014) (.022) (.018) (.025) (.037) (.021) (.090)
Interviewed During Pope's Visit -.040*** .133***
(.009) (.037)
Interviewed After Pope's Departure -.005 .135***
(.031) (.020)
Mean of dependent variable in pre-
arrival period .233 .233 .233 .297 .297 .297 .297 .314 .250
Test of equality of reported coefficients [p-value] [.083] [.771]
Individual and household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interview controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 4592 4592 4592 4592 4592 3060 4592 2513 1117
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. All specifications use data from the 1991 DHS survey for Brazil. Women sterilized before interview date are excluded from the analysis. The dependent variable in
Columns 1 to 3 is a dummy equal to one if the respondent currently uses contraceptives, and the dependent variable in Columns 4 to 9 is a dummy equal to one if the respondent reports that they do not currently use contraceptives and do
not plan to use them in the future. Marginal probit estimates are reported throughout. Standard errors allowing for clustering by week of interview are reported in parentheses in all Columns. All observations are weighted using DHS
sampling weights. The Pope arrived to Brazil on October 12th 1991 and left on October 21st 1991. Interview dates range from September 16th 1991 to February 6th 1992. The individual and household controls include the religion of the
respondent (dummies for Catholic, other, with no religion the omitted category), education level of respondent (dummies for primary, secondary, higher education with no education the omitted category), dummy variables for whether
married and currently employed, gender of household head, age of respondent, the number of children alive, household size, race dummies (Parda/Mulata/Morena, Other (Black/Oriental/Indian), with White the omitted category), an
indicator for rural location, whether the household owns a refrigerator, whether the household owns a car, and state dummies. The interview controls include the number of days since the first interview was conducted in the DHS 1991
Brazil survey, whether the interview started in the morning, the interview length, a dummy for whether multiple interview visits were required, and the day of the week of the interview. In Column 6 the sample excludes those states where all
interviews took place after the arrival of the Pope to Brazil in the 1991 visit: the excluded states are Piaui (438 observations), Paraiba (307 observations) and Pernambuco (787 observations). In Columns 8 and 9, to separate Catholics
between those Attending and Not Attending Church, we use answers to a question about frequency of church attendance: we define as Not Attending Church those Catholics that report never attending church; we define as Catholics and
Attending Church those Catholics that report attending church at least sometimes.
Dummy = 1 if respondent currently uses
contraceptives
Dummy = 1 if respondent does not use contraceptives and does not plan to use
them in the future
Table 5: Persuasion, Sexual Intercourse and Unprotected Sex
Tobit estimates
Standard errors clustered by interview week
Dependent Variable:
Sample: (1) AllRespondents (2) Catholics
(3) Catholics,
Attending
Church
(4) Catholics,
Not Attending
Church
(5) All
Respondents (6) Catholics
(7) Catholics,
Attending
Church
(8) Catholics,
Not Attending
Church
Interviewed After Pope's Arrival .860* 1.09** .575 3.38*** 1.77 2.09* 2.35*** 1.85
(.521) (.543) (.700) (.609) (1.14) (1.08) (.884) (2.13)
Percentage of women reporting some intercourse
in pre-arrival period .876 .870 .872 .868 .876 .870 .872 .868
Mean of dependent variable in pre-arrival period,
conditional on being strictly positive 6.09 7.01 7.05 6.96 6.94 6.92 6.63 7.65
Controls
Number of observations 2583 2201 1439 762 2583 2201 1439 762
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. All specifications use data from the 1991 DHS survey for Brazil. Women sterilized before interview date are excluded from the analysis. The dependent variable in Columns 1 to 4 is
the respondent's response to the question, "How many times a month do you usually have sexual intercourse?". Tobit estimates, censored at zero, are reported. This question is not asked to those women that report never having had a sexual
intercourse in their life. Hence all impacts are measured from sexually active women. The dependent variable in Columns 5 to 8 multiplies this previous outcome with a dummy equal to one if the respondent reports that they do not currently use
contraceptives and do not plan to use them in the future, and zero otherwise. Multiplying the two outcomes together creates a measure of the frequency of unprotected sex. Standard errors allowing for clustering by interview week are in parentheses.
All observations are weighted using DHS sampling weights. The pope arrived to Brazil on October 12th 1991 and left on October 21st 1991. Interview dates range from September 16th 1991 to February 6th 1992. The individual and household
controls include the religion of the respondent (dummies for Catholic, other, with no religion the omitted category), education level of respondent (dummies for primary, secondary, higher education with no education the omitted category), dummy
variables for whether married and currently employed, gender of household head, age of respondent, the number of children alive, household size, race dummies (Parda/Mulata/Morena, Other (Black/Oriental/Indian), with White the omitted category),
an indicator for rural location, whether the household owns a refrigerator, whether the household owns a car, and state dummies. The interview controls include the number of days since the first interview was conducted in the DHS 1991 Brazil
survey, whether the interview started in the morning, the interview length, a dummy for whether multiple interview visits were required, and the day of the week of the interview.
How Many Times a Month Do You Usually Have Sexual Intercourse? Monthly Frequency of Unprotected Sex
Individual, Household and Interview
Table 6: Persuasive Impacts by Marital Status
Standard errors clustered by interview week
Dependent Variable:
Estimation Method:
Sample: (1) Single (2) Married (3) Single (4) Married (5) Single (6) Married
Interviewed After Pope's Arrival .210*** .026 -1.56 2.01*** 4.24 2.06***
(.031) (.036) (.974) (.550) (3.66) (.762)
Mean of dependent variable in pre-arrival period .292 .306
Percentage of women reporting some intercourse
in pre-arrival period .729 .988 .729 .988
Mean of dependent variable in pre-arrival period,
conditional on being strictly positive 6.14 7.56 8.23 6.81
Controls
Number of observations 2945 1647 1150 1637 1150 1637
How Many Times a Month Do You
Usually Have Sexual Intercourse?
Monthly Frequency of Unprotected
Sex
Tobit Tobit
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. All specifications use data from the 1991 DHS survey for Brazil. Women sterilized before interview date are excluded from the analysis. The
dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is a dummy equal to one if the respondent reports that they do not currently use contraceptives and do not plan to use them in the future, and zero otherwise. The
dependent variable in Columns 3 and 4 is the respondent's response to the question, "How many times a month do you usually have sexual intercourse?". Tobit estimates, censored at zero, are reported. This
question is not asked to those women that report never having had a sexual intercourse in their life. Hence all impacts are measured from sexually active women. The dependent variable in Columns 5 and 6
multiplies this previous outcome with a dummy equal to one if the respondent reports that they do not currently use contraceptives and do not plan to use them in the future, and zero otherwise. Multiplying the
two outcomes together creates a measure of the frequency of unprotected sex. Standard errors allowing for clustering by week of interview in parentheses. All observations are weighted using DHS sampling
weights. The Pope arrived to Brazil on October 12th 1991 and left on October 21st 1991. Interview dates range from September 16th 1991 to February 6th 1992. The individual and household controls include
the religion of the respondent (dummies for Catholic, other, with no religion the omitted category), education level of respondent (dummies for primary, secondary, higher education with no education the omitted
category), dummy variables for whether married and currently employed, gender of household head, age of respondent, the number of children alive, household size, race dummies (Parda/Mulata/Morena,
Other (Black/Oriental/Indian), with White the omitted category), an indicator for rural location, whether the household owns a refrigerator, whether the household owns a car, and state dummies. The interview
controls include the number of days since the first interview was conducted in the DHS 1991 Brazil survey, whether the interview started in the morning, the interview length, a dummy for whether multiple
interview visits were required, and the day of the week of the interview.
=1 if respondent does not use
contraceptives and does not plan
to use them in the future
Probit
Individual, Household and Interview
Table 7: Persuasion and Fertility Outcomes
Discrete Proportional Hazard Model: Complementary Log-Log regression coefficients
Dependent variable: dummy =1 if woman gave birth at time t
(1) Baseline
Hazard (2) Controls
(3) Lead
and Lag
(4) Lead and Lag,
Alternative Clustering
(5) More Leads
and Lags (6) Catholics
(7) Below Ideal
Family Size
(8) Above Ideal
Family Size
Nine Months After Pope's Visit .245** .237** .238** .238** .273** .245* .501*** -.127
(.119) (.119) (.120) (.101) (.122) (.138) (.150) (.205)
Eight Months After Pope's Visit -.053 -.053 -.018 -.021 .140 -.390*
(.132) (.095) (.134) (.147) (.163) (.234)
Ten Months After Pope's Visit .055 .055 .090 -.018 .106 -.046
(.131) (.099) (.132) (.148) (.168) (.211)
Seven Months After Pope's Visit .200
(.122)
Eleven Months After Pope's Visit .109
(.130)
t-test: nine month = eight month [p-value] [.087] [.022] [.087] [.166] [.082] [.384]
t-test: nine month = ten month [p-value] [.278] [.160] [.278] [.172] [.064] [.771]
t-test: nine month = seven month [p-value] [.648]
t-test: nine month = eleven month [p-value] [.322]
Month and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time since last birth dummies [baseline
hazard] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of women 10347 10347 10347 10347 10347 8106 6714 3543
Number of observations [women x time] 698296 698296 698296 698296 698296 549519 447387 242204
Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the individual level in all columns except Column 4 where standard errors are clustered by religion-time
period
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. All specifications use data from the 1996 DHS survey for Brazil. The data is reshaped to create a month-year panel of fertility histories for each respondent.
Each respondent is included in the sample only for time periods when she is at risk of pregnancy. Hence we exclude eight months preceding each birth, and drop sterilized women from the sample from the month they report
becoming sterilized. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent reports a birth in that month-year, and zero otherwise in all Columns. A complementary log-log hazard model is calculated, where standard
errors are clustered by respondent in all Columns except Column 4 where they are clustered by religion-time period. In all specifications a complete series of dummies for month since last birth are included, to flexibly capture the
baseline hazard for births of order two and above. For births of order one, the dummies capture the time since the women turns 15 or enters the panel. The time period considered runs from January 1987 to December 1995.
Columns 7 and 8 split the sample into those that were below or above their ideal family size at the time of the Papal visit in October 1991. Month and year dummies are included in each specification. The additional time invariant
controls include the religion of the respondent (dummies for Catholic, other, with no religion the omitted category), education level of respondent (dummies for primary, secondary, higher education with no education the omitted
category), a dummy variable for whether currently employed, gender of household head, race dummies (Parda/Mulata/Morena, Other (Black/Oriental/Indian), with White the omitted category), an indicator for rural location,
whether the household owns a refrigerator, whether the household owns a car, and region dummies. The time varying controls are the age of the respondent in month-year t and age squared, whether the respondent has ever
married by month-year t, the number of boys alive at month-year t, and the total number of children alive at month-year t. At the foot of the table we report p-values on the test of equality between the coefficient on those born
nine months after the Pope's visit with those born eight months after the visit, and those born ten months after the visit.
Table 8: Persuasion and Long Run Total Fertility
Means and standard deviations in parentheses in Columns 1 and 2
p-values on tests of equivalence in brackets in Columns 4 and 5
Panel A: Outcomes in Brazil 1996 DHS Survey
(1) Gave Birth Nine
Months After the
Pope's 1991 Visit
(2) Gave Birth Eight
Months After the
Pope's 1991 Visit
(3) Difference
[95% CI]
(4) Two-sided t-test
of Equality of Mean
[p-value]
(5) Conditional
Difference [p-value]
Number of Women 91 70
Children Ever Born 3.35 3.27 .080
(2.26) (1.90) [ -.583, .743 ]
Children Alive 3.05 2.93 .126
(1.97) (1.66) [ -.453, .706 ]
Additional Number of Children Born Since Pope's Visit 1.54 1.70 -.162
(.638) (.823) [ -.389, .066 ]
Additional Number of Girls Born Since Pope's Visit .769 .943 -.174
(.634) (.759) [ -.391, .043 ]
Month-year of Birth of Youngest Child 1124 1125 -1.05
(15.6) (16.7) [ -6.10, 3.99 ]
Sterilized [yes=1] .385 .329 .056
(.489) (.473) [ -.095, .207 ]
Panel B: Outcomes in Brazil 2006 DHS Survey
Number of Women 49 42
Children Ever Born 4.14 4.52 -.381
(2.31) (2.73) [ -1.43, .669 ]
Children Alive 3.98 4.17 -.187
(2.14 (2.48) [ -1.14, .774 ]
Additional Number of Children Born Since Pope's Visit 3.08 3.26 -.180
(1.71) (2.04) [ -.960, .599 ]
Additional Number of Girls Born Since Pope's Visit 1.57 1.47 .095
(1.22) (1.42) [ -.455, .646 ]
Month-year of Birth of Youngest Child 1080 1069 11.1
(45.9) (8.19) [ -9.49, 31.7 ]
Sterilized [yes=1] .347 .262 .085
(.481) (.445) [ -.109, .279 ]
[.811] [.982]
[.667] [.853]
[.162] [.450]
[.116] [.632]
[.680] [.726]
[.466] [.623]
[.473] [.682]
[.700] [.806]
[.647] [.595]
Notes: Panel A (B) uses data from the 1996 (2006) DHS survey for Brazil: this is the time at which all fertility related outcomes are measured. Means and standard deviations in parentheses are shown in Columns
1 and 2. Column 1 refers to the women in the sample that have a birth exactly nine months after the Pope's 1991 visit to Brazil. Column 2 refers to the women in the sample that have a birth exactly eight months
after the Pope's 1991 visit to Brazil. Column 4 shows the p-value on a t-test of the equality of means assuming equal variances. Column 5 shows the p-value on the equality of the means conditional on the
following individual characteristics: religion (dummies for Catholic, other religion, with no religion the omitted category), education level of respondent (dummies for primary, secondary, higher education with no
education the omitted category), dummy variables for whether married and currently employed, gender of household head, age of respondent, race dummies (Parda/Mulata/Morena, Other (Black/Oriental/Indian),
with White the omitted category), an indicator for rural location, whether the household owns a refrigerator, whether the household owns a car, region dummies, the age of the respondent at first birth, and date of
first marriage. This p-value is obtained from a linear regression, where observations are weighted using DHS sampling weights and standard errors are clustered by week of interview (there are 16 clusters in 1996,
and 23 clusters in 2006).
[.732] [.795]
[.287] [.544]
[.387] [.771]
Figure 1: Persuasion and Fertility Preferences,
by Interview Date, Brazil 1991 DHS
Notes: The y-axis shows the average intent to contracept in the Brazil DHS 1991 sample, based on women who are not sterilized on
the interview date. This outcome is constructed from a dummy equal to one if the respondent reports that they do not currently use
contraceptives and do not plan to use them in the future, and zero otherwise. The figure plots the three-day moving average of this
variable (averaged over all respondents). To reduce noise in the series, we omit those three-day periods that have the lowest 1% of
respondents in any given three-day period (corresponding to having 16 or fewer responses in a consecutive three-day period) and
stop the series just prior to Christmas 1991. The vertical lines indicate the start and end dates of the Papal visit.
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Notes: Figure 2A reports the cloglog coefficients from similar fertility specifications based on the 1996 DHS survey for Brazil (excluding observations from 1992). The data is reshaped to
create a month-year panel of fertility histories for each respondent. Each respondent is included in the sample only for time periods when she is at risk of pregnancy. Thus, for each
women, the time intervals in which she is (i) sterilised, (ii) younger than 15 are excluded from the analysis. The eight months following each conception are also excluded from the analysis
(calculated retrospectively from the date of birth of each child). The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent reports a birth in that month-year, and zero otherwise. A
complementary log-log hazard model is calculated, where standard errors are allowed to be clustered by respondent. The time period considered runs from January 1987 to December
1995, excluding observations from 1992. Figure 2A reports the coefficients on month dummies for a baseline specification which only controls for the baseline hazard, month and year
dummies. A complete series of dummies for month since last birth are included, to flexibly capture the baseline hazard for births of order two and above. For births of order one, the
dummies capture the time since the women turns 15 or enters the panel. The month dummies are translated into month of conception dummies assuming full term pregnancies. The
omitted month of conception dummy is October, the month of the Papal visit.
Figure 2A: Hazard Model Coefficients on Month Dummies
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Figure 2B: Hazard Model Coefficients on Fertility Impacts
Notes: Figure 2B report the cloglog coefficients from similar fertility specifications based on the 1996 DHS survey for Brazil. The data is reshaped to create a month-year panel of fertility
histories for each respondent. Each respondent is included in the sample only for time periods when she is at risk of pregnancy. Thus, for each women, the time intervals in which she is (i)
sterilised, (ii) younger than 15 are excluded from the analysis. The eight months following each conception are also excluded from the analysis (calculated retrospectively from the date of birth
of each child). The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent reports a birth in that month-year, and zero otherwise. A complementary log-log hazard model is calculated,
where standard errors are allowed to be clustered by respondent. The time period considered runs from January 1987 to December 1995. A complete series of dummies for month since last
birth are included, to flexibly capture the baseline hazard for births of order two and above. For births of order one, the dummies capture the time since the women turns 15 or enters the
panel. The month dummies are translated into month of conception dummies assuming full term pregnancies. The omitted month of conception dummy is October, the month of the Papal
visit. Figure 2B graphs the estimated impact on the fertiltiy hazard of being born various months before and after the Papal visit to Brazil. Month and year dummies are in each specification.
The additional time invariant controls include the religion of the respondent (dummies for Catholic, other, with no religion the omitted category), education level of respondent (dummies for
primary, secondary, higher education with no education the omitted category), a dummy variable for whether currently employed, gender of household head, race dummies
(Parda/Mulata/Morena, Other (Black/Oriental/Indian), with White the omitted category), an indicator for rural location, whether the household owns a refrigerator, whether the household owns
a car, and region dummies. The time varying controls are the age of the respondent in month-year t and age squared, whether the respondent has ever married by month-year t, the number
of boys alive at month-year t, and the total number of children alive at month-year t.
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Months After Papal Visit
Estimated conception dates for births in July 1992
Oct 5-Nov 12, 1991
Speech Date Location State Venue Audience Topics Number of Words
1 12-Oct-91 Natal Rio Grandedo Norte Airport
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cardinals,
Bishops and general public
General introduction. Importance that Brazilians follow God, respect human dignity and live in peace.
Importance of spreading Catholicism in Brazil. 1245
2 12-Oct-91 Natal Rio Grandedo Norte Public venue Cardinals, Bishops and general public Importance of following God. Strong relationship between the Church and South America. 398
3 13-Oct-91 Natal Rio Grandedo Norte Public venue
Cardinals, Bishops and general
public
Importance of following God. Importance of spreading Catholicism in Brazil. Need to fight new
religious groups, drugs, consumerism and anti-natalist campaigns. Need to go back to
traditional moral Catholic values. Specifically addresses young Catholics.
1679
4 13-Oct-91 Natal Rio Grandedo Norte Public venue Cardinals, Bishops and general public Importance of spreading Catholicism in Brazil. Praises Holy Mary. 479
5 13-Oct-91 Natal Rio Grandedo Norte Private venue Bishops
Importance of spreading Catholicism in Brazil and difficulties associated with it. Problems
posed by the upsurge of new religious groups. Talks about the state of the Brazilian economy.
Bishops must set the example for the Catholic people.
2636
6 13-Oct-91 Natal Rio Grandedo Norte Cathedral Priests Importance of the role of priests in the Catholic community. Priests must be examples. 2210
7 14-Oct-91 Sào Luis Maranhao Public space General public
Promotes Catholicism. Importance of not focusing on earthly pleasures. Says that the fruits of the
earth must be used to enhance the living conditions of everyone in the society. Defends private
property but advocates land redistribution.
2127
8 14-Oct-91 Brasilia FederalDistrict
Prime Minister's
palace Prime minister Importance of fostering social-economic progress of Brazil. Importance of education. Focus on youth. 910
9 14-Oct-91 Brasilia FederalDistrict Private venue Diplomats Importance of promoting peace and international cooperation. 1185
10 15-Oct-91 Brasilia FederalDistrict Church General public
Defines what it means to believe in God. Need for Brazil to have faith in God. Holy Mary as a model to
follow. 1770
11 15-Oct-91 Goiania Goias Public Space General public Importance of spreading Catholicism in Brazil. Defines the role of the Church as central in thechallenge to spread Catholicism and to bring together Catholic people. 2002
12 15-Oct-91 Brasilia FederalDistrict Private venue Young priests
Importance of following God and of studying hard to get to know him. Need to have solid Christian
values and moral. No earthly vices. 2390
13 15-Oct-91 Brasilia FederalDistrict Private venue Jewish community representatives
Need to strengthen relationship between Catholic Church and Jewish Church. Need to respect each
other. 591
14 16-Oct-91 Cuiaba Mato Grosso Public space General public Talks about problems faced by migrants. Tackles environmental problem. 1988
15 16-Oct-91 Cuiaba Mato Grosso Public space Indios communities God loves everyone. Invites them to follow the examples of missionaries. 1549
16 16-Oct-91 Cuiaba Mato Grosso Public space Young Brazilians
They need to have God as a reference point in their lives. The young generations face the
following challenges: egoist sex, alcoholism, drugs, easy money. They have to help their
friends in fighting those sins and in embracing God. Importance of working.
2164
Table A1: The Itinerary of the Pope's 1991 Visit to Brazil
…continued on next page
Speech Date Location State Venue Audience Topics Number of Words
17 17-Oct-91 CampoGrande
Mato Grosso
do Sul Hospital Inferms Prays for the inferms and invites them to have confidence in Christ. 760
18 17-Oct-91 CampoGrande
Mato Grosso
do Sul Aeroport General public
Importance of marriage. Importance of mutual respect between husband and wife. Importance
of family and of creating offspring. "Divorce, contraceptives and abortion are practices that
destroy society".
2249
19 17-Oct-91 CampoGrande
Mato Grosso
do Sul Church
Religious people of no precise
denomination
Importance of dedicating one's life to family, work and political participation. Importance of
marriage. "Contraceptive behaviors are illicit". Abortion is a criminal practice. Importance of
caring for the children.
2101
20 18-Oct-91 Florianopolis SantaCaterina Church General public Importance of helping the poor. Importance of generosity. Need to fight consumerism and hedonism. 1745
21 18-Oct-91 Florianopolis SantaCaterina Private venue Priests
Importance of charitable dialogue and of getting to know God through the study of theology. Need to
work hard to spread the word of God. 1225
22 18-Oct-91 Florianopolis SantaCaterina Public space Religious women
Need to practice chastity, poverty and obedience to God. Importance of spreading the word of God
especially among the poor, fighting drugs and corruption. 2065
23 19-Oct-91 Vitoria EspiritoSanto Church General public Praises God and Holy Mary. 1666
24 19-Oct-91 Vitoria EspiritoSanto Church General public Praises Holy Mary. 210
25 19-Oct-91 Vitoria EspiritoSanto Favela General public
The church is fighting to eradicate poverty. Extreme wealth of the few is unjust, especially if coupled
with the extreme poverty of the majority of the people. Need to redistribute wealth but Marxism and
Communism must be avoided. Importance of international cooperation.
1817
26 19-Oct-91 Maceio Alagoas Public space General public Importance of generating offspring and of caring for the family. Importance of working. Difficultiesfaced by rural workers and urban workers: poverty, safety, drugs. 1832
27 20-Oct-91 Salvador Bahia Public space General public - Children
Speaks to children: importance of studying. Need to fight abortion. Need to help young
mothers. Importance of education. The state does not have the right to promote abortion and
artificial contraceptives.
1417
28 20-Oct-91 Salvador Bahia Public space Representatives of culture Importance of culture. Invites them to protect the Catholic traits of the Brazilian culture. Importance ofeducation. 2900
29 20-Oct-91 Salvador Bahia Church General public Praises God and Holy Mary. Invites women to follow God. 473
30 20-Oct-91 Salvador daBaia Bahia Public space General public Importance of spreading the word of God and of following God. 2216
31 20-Oct-91 Salvador daBaia Bahia Public space General public Importance of promoting peace. 271
32 21-Oct-91 Salvador Bahia Aeroport Political authorities. General public He thanks everyone who attended his speeches and who followed his travels on TV or radio.Importance to defend life and family values. 1198
Notes: Information on each of the 32 speeches was found in the Papal Archives of the Vatican. http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/it.html (accessed April 2015). Speeches highlighted in bold are those that mention fertility and
family keywords (contraceptives, abortion, sterilization, anti-natalist campaigns, divorce, marriage).
Table A1 Continued: The Itinerary of the Pope's 1991 Visit to Brazil
Table A2: The Geographic Coverage of DHS Surveys
Number of observations in the 1986, 1991, 1996 and 2006 DHS surveys, by state and region
Region State DHS 1986 DHS 1991 DHS 1996 DHS 2006
Acre 0 89
Amazonas 0 370
Rondonia 0 165
Roraima 0 44
Amapa 0 49
Para 0 525
Tocantins 0 98
Maranhao 579 349
Piaui 622 206
Ceara 870 946
Rio Grande do Norte 510 511
Paraiba 426 259
Pernambuco 1104 924
Alagoas 496 210
Sergipe 489 153
Bahia 1127 1214
Rio de Janeiro 749 0 800
Sao Paolo 769 0 1355
Minas Gerais 0 1013
Espirito Santo 0 355
Mato Grosso 0 420
Mato Grosso do Sul 0 317
Federal District 0 280
Goias 0 389
Parana 0 569
Santa Caterina 0 339
Rio Grande do Sul 0 663
Total 5892 6223 12612 15575
Notes: In the 1986 DHS survey it is not possible to separately identify observations in the Central-west region from observations in the Minas
Gerais and Espirito Santo States of the Southeast region.
Southeast 3343
1027
Central-West 3162
South 846 3310
North 709 2594
Northeast 1792 3166
Table A3: Robustness and Placebo Checks on Intended Contraceptive Use
Marginal probit estimates reported throughout
1991 DHS
(1) Quarters (2) All Regions,Region Dummies
(3) North-East
Region
(4) All Regions,
Region Dummies
(5) All Regions,
State Dummies
Interviewed After Pope's Arrival .013 .049 -.012 -.003
(.026) (.047) (.020) (.022)
Before Pope Arrival, Second Half of Interviews -.023
(.049)
After Pope's Arrival, First Half of Interviews .120**
(.053)
After Pope's Arrival, Second Half of Interviews .125*
(.073)
Mean of dependent variable in pre-arrival period .297 .259 .335 .152 .152
Test of equality of coefficients after Pope's Arrival [p-value] [.920]
Individual and household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interview controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 4592 4747 1470 8704 8704
Dependent Variable: =1 if does not use contraceptives and does not plan to use them in the future, 0 otherwise
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. The specification in Column 1 uses data from the 1991 DHS survey for Brazil. In Columns 2 and 3 we use data from the 1986 DHS Brazil
survey, and in Columns 4 and 5 we use data from the 1996 DHS Brazil surveys. Women sterilized before interview date are excluded from the analysis. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the
respondent reports that they do not currently use contraceptives and do not plan to use them in the future, and zero otherwise. Marginal probit estimates are reported throughout. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses and are clustered by week of interview in Columns 1, 4 and 5, while they are robust in Columns 2 and 3 (as no information on week of interview is available in the 1986 DHS survey). All
observations are weighted using DHS sampling weights. The Pope arrived to Brazil on October 12th 1991 and left on October 21st 1991. Interview dates range from September 16th 1991 to February 6th 1992.
The individual and household controls include the religion of the respondent (dummies for Catholic, other, with no religion the omitted category), education level of respondent (dummies for primary, secondary,
higher education with no education the omitted category), dummy variables for whether married and currently employed, gender of household head, age of respondent, the number of children alive, household
size, race dummies (Parda/Mulata/Morena, Other (Black/Oriental/Indian), with White the omitted category), an indicator for rural location, whether the household owns a refrigerator, whether the household owns
a car, and state dummies. The interview controls include the number of days since the first interview was conducted in the DHS 1991 Brazil survey, whether the interview started in the morning, the interview
length, a dummy for whether multiple interview visits were required, and the day of the week of the interview. For Columns 2 and 3, interview dates for the 1986 wave range from May to September 1986. No
information is available on the day of interview for people interviewed in the 1986 wave. Also, no information on female headship or race is available. The "Interviewed After Pope's Arrival" dummy takes value 1
if the person was interviewed in July 1986 or later. The regression in Column 2 controls for a set of region dummies instead of state dummies. The sample for the regression in Column 3 is limited to the
Northeast region of Brazil, and does not include state dummies (as these are not available in the 1986 DHS survey). For Columns 4 and 5, interview dates for the 1996 wave range from February 26th 1996 to
July 8th 1996. For observations from 1996, the variable "Interviewed After Pope's Arrival" dummy takes value 1 if the woman was interviewed 26 days after the first interview or later. Column 4 controls for
region dummies. Column 5 instead controls for state dummies rather than region dummies.
Placebo 1986 DHS Placebo 1996 DHS
Standard errors clustered by interview week, apart from Columns 2 and 3 where standard errors are robust
Table A4: Oster [2016] Correction for Impacts of Persuasion on Intended Contraceptive Use
Dependent Variable: =1 if does not use contraceptives and does not plan to use them in the future, 0 otherwise
OLS estimates reported throughout, asymptotic standard errors in parentheses
(1) Unconditional (2) Individual andHousehold Controls
(3) Interview
Controls
(4) Limited
States
(5) Catholic,
Attending
Church
(6) Catholic,
Not Attending
Church
Interviewed After Pope's Arrival .113*** .079*** .101*** .092** .103* .051
(.029) (.029) (.039) (.041) (.054) (.062)
Mean of dependent variable in pre-arrival
period .297 .297 .297 .297 .314 .250
Individual and household controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interview controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared .007 .214 .227 .231 .214 .279
Identified set for coefficient of interest:
Interviewed After Pope's Arrival [Oster
2015 bias correction]
[.067, .079] [.099, .101] [.086, .092] [.100, .103] [.033, .051]
Number of observations 4592 4592 4592 3060 2513 1117
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. All specifications use data from the 1991 DHS survey for Brazil. Women sterilized before interview date are excluded
from the analysis. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent reports that they do not currently use contraceptives and do not plan to use them in the future, and
zero otherwise. OLS regression coefficients are reported throughout. Asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses throughout. All observations are weighted using DHS
sampling weights. The Pope arrived to Brazil on October 12th 1991 and left on October 21st 1991. Interview dates range from September 16th 1991 to February 6th 1992. The individual
and household controls include the religion of the respondent (dummies for Catholic, other, with no religion the omitted category), education level of respondent (dummies for primary,
secondary, higher education with no education the omitted category), dummy variables for whether married and currently employed, gender of household head, age of respondent, the
number of children alive, household size, race dummies (Parda/Mulata/Morena, Other (Black/Oriental/Indian), with White the omitted category), an indicator for rural location, whether the
household owns a refrigerator, whether the household owns a car, and state dummies. The interview controls include the number of days since the first interview was conducted in the DHS
1991 Brazil survey, whether the interview started in the morning, the interview length, a dummy for whether multiple interview visits were required and the day of the week of the interview.
The second to last row reports the bounds on the coefficient on the dummy for being interviewed after the Pope's arrival. These are computed following Oster [2016]. For the computation
of the bounds: (i) the coefficient of proportionality between selection on observables and selection on unobservables is assumed to be one; (ii) the maximum R-squared is assumed to be
1.3 times the R-squared from the corresponding regression with the full set of control variables.
Table A5: Alternative Mechanisms
Standard errors clustered by interview week
Dependent Variable:
Estimation Method:
Sample: (1) Catholic (2) Not Catholic (3) Catholic (4) Not Religious (5) Catholic (6) Not Religious
Interviewed After Pope's Arrival .101 .091 -.045 -.035 .085 .107*
(.134) (.333) (.048) (.093) (.062) (.062)
Mean of dependent variable in pre-arrival period - - .553 .538 2.16 2.09
Mode of dependent variable in pre-arrival period Never Once a week
Controls
Number of observations 3630 347 3630 614 3567 597
Ideal Number of Children
Negative Binomial
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. All specifications use data from the 1991 DHS survey for Brazil. Women sterilized before interview date are excluded from the
analysis. The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is an ordered categorical variable for how often the individual reports attending religious services (1=never attends, 2=less than once a month,
3=once a month, 4=twice a month, 5=once a week). Non-religious individuals are not asked this question. Ordered probit estimates are reported. The dependent variable in Columns 3 and 4 is a
dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the statement that condoms reduce the risk of getting HIV, and zero otherwise. Marginal probit estimates are reported. The dependent variable in
Columns 5 and 6 is the number of children expressed as the ideal family size. Negative binomial regression coefficients are reported. Standard errors allowing for clustering by week of interview in
parentheses. All observations are weighted using DHS sampling weights. The pope arrived to Brazil on October 12th 1991 and left on October 21st 1991. Interview dates range from September 16th
1991 to February 6th 1992. The individual and household controls include the religion of the respondent (dummies for Catholic, other, with no religion the omitted category), education level of
respondent (dummies for primary, secondary, higher education with no education the omitted category), dummy variables for whether married and currently employed, gender of household head, age of
respondent, the number of children alive, household size, race dummies (Parda/Mulata/Morena, Other (Black/Oriental/Indian), with White the omitted category), an indicator for rural location, whether
the household owns a refrigerator, whether the household owns a car, and state dummies. The interview controls include the number of days since the first interview was conducted in the DHS 1991
Brazil survey, whether the interview started in the morning, the interview length, a dummy for whether multiple interview visits were required, and the day of the week of the interview.
How Often Attended Religious
Services
=1 if agree with statement that
condoms reduce the risk of
getting HIV
Ordered Probit Probit; Marginal effects reported
Individual, Household and Interview Controls
Table A6: Robustness Checks on Persuasive Impacts on Fertility Outcomes
Discrete Proportional Hazard Model: Complementary Log-Log regression coefficients
Dependent variable: dummy =1 if woman gave birth at time t in Columns 1 to 4, 7 to 10
Dependent variable: dummy =1 if woman was sterilized at time t in Columns 5 and 6
(1) Wide
Time Frame
(2) Lower
Age at
Menarche
(3) Weighting (4) RecallError (5) Sterilized (6) Sterilized
(7) Placebo 1:
1980 Papal Visit
(8) Placebo 2: 1982
Papal Stopover
(9) Northeast
Region, State
Dummies
(10) State
Dummies
Nine Months After Pope's Visit .205* .219* .262* -.011 -.066 .077 .405** .237**
(.115) (.119) (.143) (.253) (.124) (.114) (.175) (.120)
Eight Months After Pope's Visit -.080 -.043 -.091 -.226 -.101 .085 -.080 -.054
(.128) (.130) (.152) (.281) (.120) (.118) (.202) (.132)
Ten Months After Pope's Visit -.040 .051 -.011 -.055 -.006 .063 .076 .055
(.126) (.128) (.156) (.264) (.112) (.118) (.192) (.131)
Month of Pope's Visit .119 .174
(.117) (.251)
t-test: nine month = eight month [p-value] [.081] [.117] [.073] [.552] [.829] [.962] [.057] [.087]
t-test: nine month = ten month [p-value] [.129] [.309] [.174] [.900] [.709] [.925] [.178] [.279]
Month and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time since last birth dummies [baseline hazard] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of women 11935 10915 10347 10347 10303 10303 7244 7917 3976 10347
Number of observations [women x time] 1374253 832207 698296 698296 561601 561601 495218 541141 261185 698296
Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by individual
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. All specifications use data from the 1996 DHS survey for Brazil. In Columns 1 to 4, and 7 to 10, the data is reshaped to create a month-year panel of fertility histories for each respondent. Each respondent
is included in the sample only for time periods when she is at risk of pregnancy. Hence we exclude eight months preceding each birth, and drop sterilized women from the sample from the month they report becoming sterilized. In Columns 1 to 4, and 7 to 10 the dependent
variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent reports a birth in that month-year, and zero otherwise in all Columns. A complementary log-log hazard model is calculated, where standard errors are clustered by respondent in all Columns. In all specifications a complete
series of dummies for month since last birth are included, to flexibly capture the baseline hazard for births of order two and above. Month and year dummies are included in each specification. The additional time invariant controls include the religion of the respondent
(dummies for Catholic, other, with no religion the omitted category), education level of respondent (dummies for primary, secondary, higher education with no education the omitted category), a dummy variable for whether currently employed, gender of household head, race
dummies (Parda/Mulata/Morena, Other (Black/Oriental/Indian), with White the omitted category), an indicator for rural location, whether the household owns a refrigerator, whether the household owns a car, and region dummies. The time varying controls are the age of the
respondent in month-year t and age squared, whether the respondent has ever married by month-year t, the number of boys alive at month-year t, and the total number of children alive at month-year t. Columns 1 to 3 vary one dimension of the baseline specification. In
Column 1 a wider time window is considered, running from February 1979 onwards. In Column 2 the age at menarche is considered to be 12, and so all women respondents are included from that age onwards. In Column 3 observations are weighted by the DHS sample
weights multiplied by the fraction of time periods the female is in the sample. In Column 2 onwards, the sample period runs from January 1987 to December 1995, with the exception of Column 7, where it runs from January 1976 to December 1984, and of Column 8, where it
runs from January 1978 to December 1986. In Column 7, the variable "Nine months after Pope's visit" is equal to one in March 1981 (following the Pope's visit to Brazil in June-July 1980), and in Column 8 it is equal to one in April 1983 (following the Pope's stopover in June
1982). In Columns 5 and 6 the outcome variable is whether the respondent reports being sterilized in time period t. In Column 9 the sample is restricted to women resident in the Northeast region, and includes state (rather than region) dummies. In Column 10 all respondents
are included and the baseline hazard includes state (rather than region) dummies. At the foot of the table we report p-values on the test of equality between the coefficient on those born nine months after the Pope's visit with those born eight months after the visit, and those
born ten months after the visit.
Table A7: Regret over Being Sterilized
Dependent Variable : =1 if respondent reports regretting being sterilized
Marginal probit estimates reported throughout
Standard errors clustered by interview week throughout
(1) After Arrival (2) VisitPeriods (3) Catholic
(4) Catholic,
Attending
Church
(5) Catholic,
Not Attending
Church
Interviewed After Pope's Arrival .044
(.031)
Interviewed During Pope's Visit .072** .114*** .194*** -.047
(.037) (.053) (.056) (.028)
Interviewed After Pope's Departure .009 -.013 -.015 -.049
(.062) (.066) (.068) (.090)
Mean of dependent variable in pre-arrival
period .139 .139 .140 .122 .140
Test of equality of reported coefficients [p-value] [.203] [.035] [.001] [.784]
Individual and household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interview controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1462 1462 1174 839 335
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Data from the 1991 DHS survey for Brazil in all columns. The dependent variable is a dummy=1 if
the woman regrets having been sterilized. Marginal probit estimates are reported throughout. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered by week of
interview throughout. All observations are weighted using DHS sampling weights. The Pope arrived to Brazil on October 12th 1991 and left on October 21st 1991.
Interview dates range from September 16th 1991 to February 6th 1992. The individual and household controls include the religion of the respondent (dummies for
Catholic, other, with no religion the omitted category), education level of respondent (dummies for primary, secondary, higher education with no education the omitted
category), dummy variables for whether married and currently employed, gender of household head, age of respondent, the number of children alive, household size,
race dummies (Parda/Mulata/Morena, Other (Black/Oriental/Indian), with White the omitted category), an indicator for rural location, whether the household owns a
refrigerator, whether the household owns a car, and state dummies. The interview controls include the number of days since the first interview was conducted in the
DHS 1991 Brazil survey, whether the interview started in the morning, the interview length, a dummy for whether multiple interview visits were required, and the day of
the week of the interview.
Table A8: DHS Survey Samples and Other Visits of Pope John Paul II
Country Dates of Visit # Speeches # Places Visited Date Previous Visit DHS sample Male Survey?
Azerbaijan 22-23 May 2002 3 1 - 2006 Yes
Nigeria 21-23 Mar 1998 8 5 1982 2003 Yes
Kenya 18-20 Sep 1995 5 1 1985 1998 Yes
South Africa 16-18 Sep 1995 5 1 - 1998 No
Cameroon 14-16 Sept 1995 4 1 1985 1998 Yes
Philippines 11-16 Jan 1995 14 1 1981 1998 No
Uganda 5-10 Feb 1993 17 5 - 1995 Yes
Benin 3-5 Feb 1993 8 2 1982 1996 Yes
Dominican Republic 9-15 Oct 1992 19 2 1984 1996 Yes
Senegal 19-23 Feb 1992 16 4 - 1997 Yes
Tanzania 1-5 Sep 1990 15 5 - 1996 Yes
Rwanda 7-9 Sep 1990 15 2 - 1992 Yes
Chad 30 Jan - 1 Feb 1990 10 3 - 1996-97 Yes
Burkina Faso 29-30 Jan 1990 8 3 1980 1993 Yes
Mali 28-29 Jan 1990 7 1 - 1995-96 Yes
Indonesia 9-13 Oct 1989 13 6 1970 1991 No
Malawi 4-6 May 1989 10 2 - 1992 Yes
Zambia 2-4 May 1989 11 2 - 1992 No
Madagascar 28 Apr - 1 May 1989 13 3 - 1992 No
Paraguay 16-19 May 1988 14 5 - 1990 No
Peru 14-16 May 1988 13 1 1985 1991-92 No
Bolivia 9-14 May 1988 22 8 - 1989 No
Colombia 1-8 Jul 1986 36 13 - 1990 No
Togo 8-10 Aug 1985 8 4 - 1988 No
Kenya 16-18 Aug 1985 9 1 1980 1989 No
Morocco 19 Aug 1985 2 1 - 1987 No
Trinidad and Tobago 5 Feb 1985 3 2 - 1987 No
Peru 1-5 Feb 1985 15 8 - 1986 No
Ecuador 29 Jan - 1 Feb 1985 16 4 - 1987 No
Thailand 10-11 May 1984 8 3 - 1987 No
Guatemala 6-7 Mar 1984 7 1 - 1987 No
El Salvador 6 Mar 1984 5 1 - 1985 No
Table A9: Persuasion and Birthweights
Dependent Variable: Dummy = 1 ifchild is alive
Method: Probit
(1) Alive (2) Unconditional (3) Baseline (4) Leadand Lag
(5) Mothers With
Multiple Births (6) Mother FE
(7) Self-reported Birthweight
(Mothers With Multiple
Birthweights)
(8) Self-reported Birthweight
(Mothers With Multiple
Birthweights)
Born Nine Months After Pope's Visit -.031 -.057 -.071* -.069* -.122** -.042 -.386*** -.390***
(.037) (.038) (.037) (.037) (.056) (.054) (.150) (.149)
Born Eight Months After Pope's Visit -.097*** -.002 .020 -.017 .126 .122
(.030) (.034) (.046) (.047) (.203) (.204)
Born Ten Months After Pope's Visit .022 .017 .026 -.016 -.425** -.429**
(.041) (.021) (.041) (.057) (.175) (.186)
Born Eleven Months After Pope's Visit -.035
(.252)
Mean of dependent variable .912
t-test: nine month = eight month [p-value] [.179] [.087] [.657] [.001] [.001]
t-test: nine month = ten month [p-value] [.022] [.028] [.745] [.847] [.847]
Month and year dummies Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes No Yes Yes Yes Time Varying Yes Yes
Number of women 7965 3198 3198 3198 810 810 810 810
Number of observations [mother x
child] 24810 4117 4117 4117 1729 1729 1724 1724
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. All specifications use data from the 1996 DHS survey for Brazil. The dependent variable in Columns 2-6 is the log of the birth weight of the child (in grams) as reported on the birth card.
The dependent variable in Columns 7-8 is the mother's self-reported birth size of the child in five categories: 1=very small, 2=smaller than average, 3=average, 4=larger than average, 5=very large. Anthropometrics at birth are reported only for children
born in the five years prior to the 1996 survey, so that the dates of birth for children range from 1991 to 1996. OLS regressions are estimated in Columns 2-6, ordered probits are estimated in Columns 7-8. In Column 5 onwards the sample is limited to
those mothers having multiple births (each with birthweight data). Standard errors are clustered by region-religion in all columns. In Column 1 and 2 onwards we control for a complete series of month of birth dummies, and year of birth dummies are
included. The following controls are also included in all specifications in Column 1 and from Column 3 onwards: the birth order of the child, the child's gender, the age of the mother at birth and its square, whether the mother was married at the time of
birth, the religion of the respondent (dummies for Catholic, other, with no religion the omitted category), education level of respondent (dummies for primary, secondary, higher education with no education the omitted category), a dummy variable for
whether currently employed, gender of household head, race dummies (Parda/Mulata/Morena, Other (Black/Oriental/Indian), with White the omitted category), an indicator for rural location, whether the household owns a refrigerator, whether the
household owns a car, and region dummies. At the foot of the table we report p-values on the test of equality between the coefficient on those born nine months after the Pope's visit with those born eight months after the visit, and those born ten months
after the visit.
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by region-religion
Ordered ProbitsOLS
3257 3241 3240
Log of the birthweight of child (grams) Mother's self-reported birthweight of child incategories (1=very small, …, 5=very large)
Figure A1: Persuasion Rate Estimates
Notes: The Figure shows various estimates of persuasion rates from the literature. The horizontal line shows the persuasion rate
from our baseline estimate. Source: DellaVigna and Gentzkow [2010, Annual Reviews].
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Panel A: 1994 SINASC
Panel B: 2002-2012 SINASC
Figure A2: Normalized Number of Births by Month of
Conception in Vital Statistics Data
Notes: Data in both panels is from the SINASC (Sistema de Informação sobre Nascidos Vivos), that translates as the
Information System on Live Births, established in the early 1990s. This is a national system which automatically sends the
data from birth certificates from the municipalities (which are supervised by the state health secretariats) to the states and
finally to SINASC at the Federal level. Panel A uses data for birth records for 1994, the first year for which the SINASC data
are publicly available. The sample in Panel A includes 2,070,907 individual birth records (the 1994 SINASC data includes
information on 2,457,570 birth records, but 386,663 of these are removed as no information on date of birth is available).
Panel B presents the statistics reported in Pinedo and Bermudez [2016] - who translate the SINASC name as the NSIBR
(National System of Information on Birth Records). These include 32,492,779 birth records for the period 2002-2012 from
the SINASC natality files. Births are normalized to 100 in October in both panels.
Month of Conception
Month of Conception

C. Cohort Born Ten Months After Papal Visit
Notes: Each figure graphs the estimated effect of being born nine months after the Pope's October 1991 visit to Brazil, on the log of birth weight (in grams) at each quantile of the conditional distribution of the log of birth
weight, and the associated 90% confidence interval, with robust standard errors. We control for a complete series of month of birth dummies, year of birth dummies, the birth order of the child, the child's gender, the age
of the mother at birth and its square, whether the mother was married at the time of birth, the religion of the respondent (dummies for Catholic, other, with no religion the omitted category), education level of respondent
(dummies for primary, secondary, higher education with no education the omitted category), a dummy variable for whether currently employed, gender of household head, race dummies (Parda/Mulata/Morena, Other
(Black/Oriental/Indian), with White the omitted category), an indicator for rural location, whether the household owns a refrigerator, whether the household owns a car, and region dummies.
Figure A4: Quantile Regression Estimates of Persuasion on Birth Weights
A. Cohort Born Nine Months After Papal Visit B. Cohort Born Eight Months After Papal Visit
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